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the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the beforementioned parties, in such shares as
the jury, by the verdict, shall find and direct.
III. Prorziddalwins, and be it enacted, that not more than one action shall be
for, and in respect of, t.e sname subject matter of complaint; and that every such
action shall be commenced within twelve calendar months after the death of such
deceased person.
IW. And b~eit enaded, that in every such action, the plaintiff on the record
shall he required, tog'ether with the declaration, to deliver to the defendant, or his
attorney, a full particular of the person, or persons, for whom, and on whose behalf, such action shall be brought, and of the nature of the claim, in respect of
which damages shall be sought to be recovered.
V. And be it ena, led, that the following words and expressions are intended to
have the meanings hereby assigned to them respectively, so far as such meanings
are not excluded by the context, or by the nature of the subject matter; that is to
say, words denoting the singular number are to be understood to apply also to a
plurality of persons, or things, and words denoting the masculine gender are to be
under.,tood to apply alo to persons of the feminine gender; and the word "person" shall apply to bodies politic and corporate; and the word "parent" shall
include father and mother, and grandfather and grandmother, and stepfather and
stepmother; and the word " child" shall include son and daughter, and grandson and granddaughter, and stepon and stepdaughter.
V1. And be it enacted, that this Act shall come into operation, from and immediately after the passing theieof, and that [repealed, Stat. L-tw Rev. Act, 1875]
* * * * nothing herein contained shall apply to that part of the United Kingdom, called Scotland.
VII. [Repealed, Stat. Law Rev. Act, 1875].
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Upon a writ of habeas eaoius, the United States Courts haye jurisdiction to discharge the petitioner, when found to be in custody for an act done, or omitted, in
pursuance of a law of the United States, no matter from whom, or under what authority, the process may have issued under which he is held.
The circumstances of a homicide, committed by an officer of the United States,
will be inquired into by the United States Courts, to determine whether the act was
committed in the line of his duty, or was malicious, wanton, or reckless, and without any reasonable apparent necessity. The Court does not make the inquiry at
all, to decide whether a State statute has been violated, or whether the homicide
has been committed upon land within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
In matters of the public peace, in which the Government of the United States
is concerned, the Marshals and Deputy Marshals, within the scope of their authority, are National peace officers, with all the statutory and common law powers
appertaining to peace officers.
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An assault upon, or an assassination of a Judge of an United States Court,
"whilst traveling for the purpose of holding Court, is a breach of the peace, affectIng the authority and interests of the United States, and within the jurisdiction and
power of the Marshal, or his deputies, to prevent, as peace officers of the Government of the United States.

This was an application for the discharge of David Neagle,
.a .Deputy United States Marshal.
The facts of the case may be divided into two stages; the
first as followsOn the third of September, 1888, certain cases were pending in this Court, between Frederick IV. Sharon, as executor, against DavidS. Yeriy and SarahAlthea Terry, his wile, and between 1)-aucis G. Xewlands, as trustee, and others,
against the same parties, on demurrers to bills to revive, and carry into execution,
the final decree of the Court, in the suit of Williamn Sharon against Sarah A/thea
Hill, and were decided on that day. That suit was brought to have an alleged
marriage contract between the parties adjudged to be a forgery, and obtain its surrender and cancelation. The decree rendered adjudged the alleged marriage contract to lie a forgery, and ordered it to be surrendered and canceled. The decree
was rendered after the death of William Sharon, and was therefore entered as of
the day when the case was submitted to the Court. By reason of the death of
Sharon, it was necessary, in order to execute the decree, that the suit should be revived. Two bills were filed, one by the executor of the estate of Sharon, andthe
other, a bill of revivor and supplemental by Newlands, as trustee, for thatpurpose.
In deciding the cases, the Court gave an elaborate opinion upon the questions
involved, and whilst it was being read, certain disorderly proceedings took place,
for which the defendants, David S. Terry and his wife, were adjudged guilty of
contempt and ordered to be imprisoned. See Zn re Teriy, 36 Fed. Repr. 419.

The second stage of the case began upon the release of Terry
and his wife, who made various threats of personal violence to
Justice FIELD and the Circuit Judge. These threats were that
they would take the lives of both Judges ; those against
Justice FIELD were sometimes, that they would take his
life dii-ectly; at other times, that they would subject him to
great personal indignities and humiliations, and if he resented
it, they would kill him.
These threats were not made in ambiguous terms, but openly and repeatedly, not
to one person, but to many persons, until they became the subject of conversation
throughout the State and of notice in the public journals. Reports of these threats,
through the press, and through reports of the United States Marshal and United
States Attorney, reached Washington, and in consequence of them, the AttorneyGeneral thought proper to give instructions to the Marshal of the United States for
the Northern District of California, to take proper measures to protect the persons
of the Judges from violence at the hands of Terry and his wife. On the return
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of Justice FIELD from Washington, to attend his circuit, in June last, the probability of an attack by Terry upon him, was the subject of conversation throughout
the State, and of notices in some of the journals in the City of San Francisco. It
was the general expectation that if Terry met Justice FIELD, violence would be
attempted upon the latter.
In consequence of this general belief and expectation, and the fact that the Attorney-General of the United States had given instructions to the Marshal to see
that tile persons of Justice FIELD and of the Circuit Judge, should be protected
from violence, the Marshal of the Northern District appointed the petitioner in
this case. David Neagle, to accompany Mr. Justice FIELD whilst engaged in the
performance of his duties and whilst passing from one district to another within
his circuit, so a- to guard him against the threatened attacks. He was specially
conmissioned as a deputy by Mr. Franks, whose instructions to him were that he
should protect Justice FtIf.) at all hazards, and knowing the violent and desperate character of Terry, that he should be active and alert, and be fully prepared
for any emergency, but not to be rash; and in case any violence was attempted
from any one, to call upon the assailant to stop, and to inform him that he was an
officer of the United States.
Terry was a man of great size and strength, who had the reputation of being always armed with a bowie-knife, in the use of which he was specially skilled, and
of showing great readiness to draw and use it upon persons towards whom he entertained any enmity or had any grievance, real or fancied.

On the 8th of August, 1889, Justice FIELD left San Francisco for Los Angeles, in order to hear a habeas coqus case
which was returnable before him at that city on the loth of
August, and also to be present at the opening of the Court on
the 12th. He was accompanied by Deputy Marshal Neagle,
the petitioner. Justice FIELD heard the habeas corpus case on
the ioth of August. On the I2th of August he opened the
Circuit Court, Judge Ross sitting with'him, and he delivered
on the latter day an opinion in an important land case, and also
an opinion in the habeas corpus case. On the following day
the Court heard an application for an injunction in an important water case from San Diego County. No other cases being
ready for hearing before the Circuit Court, he took the train on
Tuesday, the I 3 th, at 1:3o o'clock in the afternoon, for San
Francisco, where he was expected to hear a case then awaiting
his arrival, immediately upon his return, being accompanied on
his return by Deputy Marshal Neagle. On the morning of
the I 4 th, between the hours of seven and eight, the train arrived at Lathrop, in San Joaquin County, which is in the Northem District of California, a station at which the train stopped
for breakfast. Justice FIELD and the Deputy Marshal at once
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entered the dining-room, there to take their breakfast, and took
their seats at the third table in the middle row of tables. Justice FIELD seated himself at the extreme end, on the side looking toward the-door. The Deputy Marshal took the next seat
on the left of'the Justice. What subsequently occurred is thus
stated in the testimony of Justice FIELD- "A few minutes afterward, Judge Terry and his wife came in.
W,hen Mrs.
Terry saw me, which she did directly she got diagonally opposite me,she wheeled
around suddenly and went out in great haste. I afterwards understood, as you
heard here, that she went for her satchel. Judge Terry walked past, opposite to
me, and took his seat at the second table below. The only remark I made to Mr.
Neagle was, ' There is Judge Terry and his wife.' He remarked, ' I see him.'
Not another word was said. I commenced eating my breakfast. I saw Judge
Terry take his seat. In a moment or two afterwards I looked round and saw
Judge Terry rise from his seat. I supposed at the time he was going out to meet
his wife, as she had not returned, so 1 went on with my breakfast. It seems, howiver, that he came round back of me-I did not see him-and he struck me a
violent blow in the face, followed instantaneously by another blow. Coming so
immediately together, the two blows seemed like one assault. I heard ' Stop!
stop!' cried by Neagle. Of course I was for a moment dazed by the blows. I
turned my head round and I saw that great form of Terry's, with his arm raised
and his fists clenched to strike me. I felt that a terrific blow was coming, and his
arm was descending in a curved way, as though to strike the side of my temple,
when I heat d Neagle cry out, ' Stop ! stop ! I am an officer.' • Instantly two shots
followed. I can only explain the second shot from the fact that he did not fail
instantly. I did not get up from my seat, although it is proper for me to say that a
friend of mine thinks that I did; but I did noi. I looked around and saw Terry
on the floor. I looked at him and saw that peculiar movement of the eyes that
indicates the presence of death. Of course it was a great shock to me. It is impossible for any one to see a ma in the full vigor of life, with all those faculties
that constttute life, instantly extinguished, without being affected, and I was. I
looked at him for a moment, then rose from my seat, went around and looked at
him again, and passed on. Great excitement followed. A gentleman came to me
whom I did not know, lut I think it was Mr. Lidgerwood, who has been examined as a witness in this case, and said : 'What is this?' I said: ' I am a Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States. My name is Judge FiMtD. Judge Terry
threatened my life, and attacked me, and the Deputy Marshal has shot him.' The
Deputy Marshal was perfectly cool and collected, and stated: ' I am a Deputy
Marshal and I have shot him to protect the life of Judge FIELD.' I cannot give
you the exact words, but I give them to you as near as I can remember them. A
few moments afterwards the Deputy Marshal said to me : ' Judge, I think you had
better go to the car.' I said, ' Very well.' Then this gentleman, Mr. Lidgerwood, said: ' I think you had better.' And with the two I went to the car. I
asked Mr. Lidgerwood to go back and get my hat and cane, which he did. The
Marshal went with me, remained for some time and then left his seat in the car,
and, as I thought, went back to the dining-room. (This is, however, I am told, a
mistake, and that he only went to the end of the car.) He returned, and either

MATTER OF DAVID NEAGLE.

he or some one else stated that there was great excitement, that Mrs. Terry was
calling for sorie violent proceedings. I mtut say Ier,! that, dreadful as it is to take
life, it was only a question of seconds whether my life or Judge Terry's life should
be taken. I am firmly convinced that had the Marshal delayed two seconds both
he and myself would have been the victims of Terry."

In answer to a question whether he had a pistol or other
wca.)on on the occasion of the homicide, Justice FIELD replied" Nn, sir. I have never had on my person, or used a weapon, since I went on
the l.ench of the Supreme Court of the State, on October 13, 1857, except once."
(That was on an occasion when he crossed the Sierra Nevada Mountains, in 1862.)
"With that exception, I have not had on my person, or used a pistol or other
deadly weapon."

Mr. Neagle in his testimony stated that, before the train arrived at Fresno, he got up and went out on the platform, leaving the train, and there saw Terry and his wife get on the cars;
that when the train arrived at Merced, he spoke to the conductor, Woodward, and informed him that he was a Deputy
United States Marshal; that Judge FIELD was on the train,
and also Terry and his wife, and that he was apprehensive that
when the train arrived at Lathrop, there would be trouble between those parties, and inquired whether there was any officer
at that station, and was informed in reply that there was a constable there; that he then requested the conductor to send
word to the officer to be at Lathrop on the arrival of the train,
and that he also applied to other parties to induce them to
endeavor to secure assistance for him at that place in case it
should be needed.
The Deputy Marshal further stated that when the train arrived at Lathrop Justice
FIELD went into the dining-room, he accompanying the Justice; that they took
seats at a table; that shortly after they were seated, Terry and his wife entered the
dining-room, his wife following him several feet in the rear; that when the wife
reached a point nearly opposite Justice FIE';LD, she turned around and went out
rapidly from the room, and, as appeared from what afterward followed, she went to
the car to get her satchel. When she returned from the car the satchel was taken
from her, and it was found to contain a pistol-revolver--containing six chambers,
all of which were loaded with ball. This pistol lay on the top of the other articles
in the satchel. The witness further stated that Terry passed down opposite Justice
FIELD, to a table below where they were sitting; that in a few minutes, whilst
Justice FIELD was eating, Terry rose from his seat, went around behind him--the
Justice not seeing him at the time-and struck him two blows, one on the side and
the other on the back of the head; that the second blow followed the other imme.
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diately; that one was given with the right hand and the other with the left; that
Terry then drew back his hand, with his fist clenched, apparently to give the Justice a violent blow on the side of his head, when he, Neagle, sprang to his feet,
calling out to Terry, "Stop! Stop! I am an officer;" that Terry bore at the time
on his face an expression of intense hate and passion, the most malignant the witness had ever seen in his life, and that he had seen a great many men in his time
in such situations, and that the expression meant life or death for one or the other;
that as he cried out those words, "Stop! Stop! I am an officer," he jumped between Terry and Justice FIELD, and, at that moment, Terry appeared to recognize
him, and instantly, with a growl, moved his right hand to his left breast, to the
position where he usually carried his bowie-knife; that, as his hand got there, the
Deputy Marshal raised his pistol and shot twice in rapid succession, killing him
almost instantly. He further stated that the position of Judge FIELD was suchhis legs being at the time under the table, and he sitting-that it would have been.
impossible for him to have done anything even if he had been armed, and that
Terry had a very furious expression, which was characterized by the witness as that
of an infuriated giant. He also added, that his cry to him to stop was so loud that
it could be heard throughout the whole room, and that he believed that a delay in
shooting of two seconds would have been fatal both to himself and Justice FIELD.

The facts thus stated in the testimony of Justice FIELD and
the petitioner, were corroborated by the testimony of all the
witnesses to the transaction. The petitioner soon afterwards
accompanied Justice FIELD to the car, and whilst in the car, he
was arrested by a constable, and at the station below Lathrop
was taken by that officer from the car to Stockton, the county
seat of San Joaquin County, where he was lodged in the
county jail. Mr. Justice FIELD was obliged to continue on to
San Francisco without the protection of any officer. On the
evening of that day, Mrs. Terry, who did not see the transaction, but was at the time outside of the dining-room, made an
affidavit that the killing of Terry was murder, and charged
Justice FIELD and Deputy Marshal Neagle with the commission of the crime. Upon this affidavit, a warrant was issued
by a Justice of the Peace at Stockton against Neagle and also
against Justice FIELD. Subsequently, after the arrest of Justice
FIELD, and after his being released by the United States Circuit
Court on habeas corpus upon his own recognizance, the proceeding against him before the Justice of the Peace was dismissed, the Governor of the State having written a letter to the
Attorney-General of the State, declaring that the proceeding,
if persisted in, would be a burning disgrace to the State, and
the Attorney-General having advised the District Attorney of
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San Joaquin County to dismiss it. There was no other testimony whatever before the Justice of the Peace, except the
affidavit of Sarah Althea Terry, upon which the warrant was
issued.
The petition was accordingly presented, on behalf of Neagle,
to the Circuit Court of the United States for a writ of habeas
coipus in this case, alleging, among other things, that he was
arrested and confined in prison for an act done by him in the
performance of his duty, namely, the protection of Mr. Justice
FIELD, and taken away from the further protection, which he
was ordered to give to him. The writ was issued, and upon
its return the Sheriff of San Joaquin County produced a copy
of the warrant issued by the Justice of the Peace of that county,
and of the affidavit of Sarah Althea Terry, upon which it was
issued.
A traverse to that return was then filed in this case, presenting various grounds why the petitioner should not be held, the
most important of which wereThat an officer of the United States, specially charged with a particular duty,
that of protecting one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
whilst engaged in the performance of his duty, could not, for an act constituting
the very performance of that duty, be taken from the further discharge of his duty
and imprisoned by the State authorities, andThat, when an officer of the United States, in the discharge of his duties, is
charged with an offense consisting in the performance of those duties, and is sought
to be arrested, and taken from the further performance of them, he can be brought
before the tribunals of the nation of which he is an officer, and the fact then
inquired into.

John T. Carey, United States Attorney; Richard S. Mesick,
Samuel Jf Wilson, William F. Herrin, W. L. Dudley, C. L.
Ackerman,j C. Campbell,H. C. McPike, for petitioner.
G. A. Johnson, Attorney-General of the State of California;.
j. P. Langhorne; Avery C. White, District Attorney of San
Joaquin County, California, for respondent.
SAWYER, Circ. J., September 14, 1889. The petitioner has
sued out a writ of habeas corpus, returnable before the Court,.
alleging that he is unlawfully deprived of his liberty, and imprisoned, by virtue of a warrant issued by a Justice of thePeace of San Joaquin County, in this State, charging him with.
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a felonious homicide, whilst the act thus characterized was a
lawful act performed in the discharge of his duties as an officer of the United States; and the first question presented is,
whether this Court has -jurisdiction to inquire into the truth
of that allegation.
Upon the question of jurisdiction, Section 75 1, Rev. Stat.,
provides that"The Supreme Court and the Circuit and District Courts shall have power to
issue writs of habeas corbus;"

and Section 752 further provides, that"The several justices and judges of the said courts, within their respective
jurisdictions, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of
an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty."

There is no limit in these provisions to the jurisdiction of
these courts and judges to inquire into the restraint of liberty
of any person. But Section 753 prescribes some limitations,
among which is"The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless
where he is in custody * * * for an act done, or omitted, in pursuance of a
law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court, or judge
thereof; or is in custody, in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of
the United States."

And this legislation, in the language of the Chief Justice,

in McCardle's case (1867), 6 Wall. (73 U. S) 325-6, in commenting upon the same provision in a prior act"[This legislation] is of the most comprehensive character. It brings within
the habeas corpis jurisdiction of every court, and of every judge, every possible
case of privation of liberty, contrary to the National Constitution, treaties or laws.
It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction."

And again, in Exparte Royall (1885), 117 U.
Supreme Court says-

S. 249,

the

"[But] as the judicial power of the nation extends to all cases arising under the
Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States; as the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended, unless 'ihen in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it; and as Congress has power to pass all
laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof; no doubt can exist as to the power of Congress thus to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union, and of their justices and judges. That the
petitioner is held under the authority of a State cannot affect the question of the
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power or jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, to inquire into the cause of his commitment, and to discharge him, if he be restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution. The Grand Jurors who found the indictment, the Court into which
it was returned and by whose order he was arrested, and the officer who holds him
in custody, are all equally with citizens, under a duty, from the discharge of which
the State could not release them, to respect and obey the supreme law of the land,
' any thing in the Constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding,' and that equal power does not belong to the courts and judges of the several
States; that they cannot under any authority conferred by the State, discharge
from custody persons held by authority of the courts of the United States, or uf
commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the General Government acting under
its laws, results from the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the r'nited
States: AbA/en.an v. Booth (1858), 21 How. (62 U. S.) 5o6; Tarble's Case (1871),
13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 397; Robb v. Connoliy (1$83), III U.S. 624. Weare therefore, of opinion that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction, upon writ of habeas corpus,
to inquire into the cause of appellants commitment, and to discharge him, if he
be held in custody in violation of the Constitution."

In the exercise of this jurisdiction there is no conflict betveen the authority of the State and of the United States.
The State in such cases is subordinate, and the National Government paramount.
"The Constitution and laws of the United States are the supreme law of the
land, and to these every citizen of every State owes obedience, whether in his individual or official capacity." Siebold's case (1879), 100 U. S. 392; see also Teanessee v. Davis (1879), Id. 257-8.

The exclusive authority of the State to determine whether
an offense has been committed against the laws of the State,
is now earnestly pressed upon our attention. In Siebold's case,
the Court says"It seems to be often overlooked that a National Constitution has been adopted
in this country, establishing a real government therein, operating upon persons
and territory and things; and which, moreover, is, or should be, as dear to every
American citizen as his State government is. Vhenever the true conception of
the nature of this Government is once conceded, no real difficulty will arise in the
just interpretation of its powers. But if we allow ourselves to regard it as a hostile organization, opposed to the proper sovereignty and dignity of the State governments, we shall continue to be vexed with difficulties as to its jurisdiction and
authority. No greater jealousy is required to be exercised toward this Government, in reference to the preservation of our liberties, than is proper to be exercised toward the State governments. Its powers are limited in number and clearly
defined, and its action within the scope of those powers is restrained by a sufficiently rigid bill of rights for the protection of its citizens from oppression. The
true interest of the people of this country requires that both the National and
State governments shall be allowed, without jealous interference on either side,
to exercise all- the powers which respectively belong to them, according to a fair
VOL. XXXVII.- 3 8
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and practical construction of the Constitution. State rights and the rights of the
United States should be equally respected. Both are essential to the preservation
of our liberties and the perpetuity of our institutions. But in endeavoring to vin.
dicate the one, we should not allow our zeal to nullify or impair the other." ioo
U. S. 394; see Id. 266-7.

This Court, then, has jurisdiction to inquire upon this writ
into the cause of the imprisonment of the petitioner, and if,
upon such inquiry, he is found to be "in custody for an act
done or committed in pursuance of a law of the United States,"
then he is in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and he is entitled to be discharged, no
matter from whom, or under what authority, the process under
which he is held, may have issued-the Constitution and laws
of the United States made in pursuance thereof, being the
supreme law of the land.
The homicide in question, if an offense at all, is, it must be
conceded, an offense under the laws of the State of California,
and only the State can deal with it as such or in that aspect.
It is not claimed to be an offense under the laws of the United
States. But if the killing of Terry by Neagle was an "act
done * * * in pursuance of a law of the United States,"
within, the powers of the National Government, then it is not,
and it cannot be, an offense against the laws of the State of
California, no matter what the statute of the State may be, the
laws of the United States being the supreme law of the land.
A State law which contravenes a valid law of the United States,
is in the nature of things, necessarily void-a nullity. It must
give place to the "supreme law of the land." In legal contemplation there can no more be two valid laws which are in
conflict, operating upon the same subject matter at the same
time, than in physics two bodies can occupy the same space at
the same time.
But, as we have seen by the authorities cited, it is the
exclusive province of the Judiciary of the United States to
ultimately and conclusively determine any question of right,
civil or criminal, arising under the laws of the United States.
It is, therefore, the prerogative of the National courts to conclusively construe the National statutes and determine whether
the homicide in question was the result of an "act done in
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pursuance of a law of the United States," and when that question has been determined in the affirmative, the petitioner
must be discharged, and the State has nothing more to do
with the matter. All we claim is the right to determine the
question, was the homicide the result of "an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States ?" and if so, discharge
the petitioner.
As incidental to and involved in that question, it is necessary to inquire whether the act of the petitioner was performed
under such circumstances as to justify it. If it was, then he
was in the line of his duty. If not, then it was outside his
duty. We do not make the inquiry at all for the purpose of
determining whether the act was an offense, or justifiable under
the statutes of the State. We do not assume to consider the
case in that aspect at all. We simply determine whether it
was an act performed in pursuance of a law of the United
States. Nor do we act in this matter because we have the
slightest doubt as to the impartiality of the State courts, and
their ability and disposition to, ultimately, do exact justice to
the petitioner. We have not the slightest doubt or apprehension in that particular; but there is a principle involved.
The question is, has the petitioner a right to have his acts
adjudged, and, if found to have been performed in the strict
line of his authority and duty, a further right to be protected
by that sovereignty whose servant he is and whose laws he
was executing? If he has that right, then there is no encroachment upon the State jurisdiction, and this Court must necessarily entertain his petition and determine his rights under it,
and under the laws of the United States. It has no discretion.
It cannot decline to hear him, without an utter disregard of
one of the most important duties imposed upon it by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. What the State
tribunals might, or might not do, in this particular instance, is
not a matter for a moment's consideration. The question is,
what are the rights of the petitioner as to having his case
heard and disposed of in the courts of the sovereignty whose
servant he is and whose laws he was employed in executing.
If he has a right to be heard in this Court, then we must hear
him, willing or unwilling. There is no alternative. Whether
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the writ should issue, in this case, was not a question of
"expediency," and whether the petitioner shall be discharged
or remanded is not a. question of "policy " or "comity," as
• suggested in some quarters. It is a question of personal right
and personal liberty, arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, which the Court cannot ignore. There
is a class of cases, of which Ex parte Royal! is an example,
in which the Court may exercise a discretion as to the time of
interference, but, in our opinion, this is not one of them: Ex
parte Royal (I885), 117 U. S. 25 1.
But if it rests in our discretion to discharge or remand the
petitioner to the State courts, to be there first tried for an
offense against the State, while we are satisfied that he is
entitled to be discharged, to what useful end would he be sent
back, since upon being tried and convicted he would still be
discharged by the National courts on habeas corpus, if the act
should appear to them to have been performed in pursuance
of a law of the United States? This would be but to put the
State to great useless expense, and subject the petitioner, if
guilty of no offense, to unjust imprisonment in violation of his
legal rights, until his trial could be had, and his writ of habeas
corpus afterwards again sued out, heard and decided, when the
result, in all probability, would at last be the same. Evidently,
public justice demands that the case should be "summarily"
decided now, as required by Section 761, Rev. Stat. The Court
has no right to trifle with the petitioner's constitutional rights,
by unnecessarily subjecting him to unjust imprisonment, great
expense and vexatious delays. In case of a remand and conviction, the National courts must hear and decide the case at
last. Far better for all concerned, that they should. decide it
now, and forever, end it. We have no desire to usurp a jurisdiction that does not belong to us. We have enough to do in
exercising the admitted jurisdiction conferred upon us, without seeking to enlarge it in the smallest particular, but we
must perform our duty as we understand it, be the consequences what they may.
The Statutes of the United States also make ample provision
for giving full effect to the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
where the petitioner alleges that he is restrained of his liberty
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in violation of the Constitution or of a law of the United
States, in Section 766, which reads as follows, to wit" Pending the proceedings or appeal in the cases mentioned in the three preceding secti6ns, and until final judgment therein, and after final judgment of discharge, any proceeding against the person so imprisoned or confined or restrained
of his liberty, in any State court, or by or under the authority of any State, for any
matter so heard and determined, or in process of being heard and determined,
under such writ of habeascorpius, shall be deemed null and void."

It is, therefore, only necessary, in order to dispose of the
case, to inquire and ascertain whether the petitioner is in
custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United
States.
As we have seen from the statement of facts, Mr. Justice
FIELD, of the United States Supreme Court, allotted to the
Ninth Circuit, was traveling, officially, from one part of his
circuit to another, in pursuance of the requirements of the
statutes of the United States, for the purpose of holding a Circuit Court. By reason of threats against his life made by dissatisfied litigants, generally known and published in the newspapers and brought to the knowledge of the United States
Marshal for the Northern District of California, and by him
called to the attention of the Attorney General of the United
States, that officer directed the Marshal to furnish the Justice
with protection while thus engaged in the performance of his
judicial duties on the circuit. The Marshal, deeming it proper,
furnished the necessary protection by assigning that duty to
the petitioner, who was a United States Deputy Marshal. The
claim is that the petitioner, as such Deputy Marshal, was affording the only protection practicable to Justice FIELD, in the lawful discharge of his duty, when the homicide was committed,
and that the killing was necessary for the preservation of the
lives of both Justice FIELD and himself, at the time the fatil
shot was fired. The homicide was committed at Lathrop, and
not upon land purchased by the United States with the consent
of the State for the needful uses of the United States, in pursuance of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.
Conceding the points to be as stated, do they present a case
of an act performed in pursuance of a law of the United States,
subject to their jurisdiction and to the jurisdiction of this
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Court, and is the petitioner held under an arrest on a charge
of murder by the State, "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," within the meaning of
the statute ?
It is urged that, since the homicide was committed in the
State at large, and not in the courthouse, or upon land within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the question as
to whether the homicide is murder, is a question arising exclusively under the laws of the State, and that it can be investigated and determined by the State courts alone. It is admitted
on the part of the State, that the United States has exclusive
jurisdiction over the Custom House Block and "overall places
purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State, in
which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," in pursuance
of Section 8, Article I, of the National Constitution, and that
the State has no jurisdiction whatever of any offense committed in such places. But it is contended that the United
States has no jurisdiction of offenders outside the lands so purchased, in other portions of th6 State, but that in the State at
large the jurisdiction of the State is exclusive. This proposition, like most others urged by those who insist on extreme
State rights doctrines, wholly ignores the principle that there
can be no legal conflict, or inconsistency, in matters wherein
the State is subordinate, and the United States paramountwhere the Constitution and laws of the United States are the
supreme law of the land. We have already seen that although
in certain cases the courts of the United States have jurisdiction to discharge on habeas corpus, prisoners held in custody
by the State courts in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, yet that the State courts "cannot under
any authority conferred by the State, discharge from custody
persons held by authority of the courts of the United States,
or of commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the general government acting under such laws," and that this "results from the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the
United States." This principle, established in the Booth and
Tarble cases, was recently properly recognized by the Supreme
Court of California, when upon the return of the writ of habeas

MATTER OF DAVID

NEAGLE.

corpus in Ter;y's case, it appearing that he was in custody by
virtue of a judgment of the United States Circuit Court, it declined to require the sheriff to produce his body. As the
powers and duties of the State and National courts are by no
means reciprocal, in this class of cases, so they are not reciprocal in the matter of territorial jurisdiction mentioned, as
claimed on the part of the State. The Constitution and laws
of the United States, as to those matters wherein they are supreme, extend over every foot of the territories of the United
States, and the jurisdiction of its courts to enforce rights derived thereunder, is as extensive as the territory to which they
are applicable.
In Siebold's case, the Supreme Court, in reply to an argument in favor of a wide extension of State rights, uses the following language peculiarly applicable to the point now under
consideration"Somewhat akin to the argument which has been considered, is the objection,
that the Deputy Marshals, authorized by the Act of Congress to be created, and to
attend the elections, are atuthorized to keep thepeace ; and that this is a duty which
belongs to the State authorities alone. It is argued that the preservationofpeace
and good orderin society is not within the powers confided to the Government of
the United States, but belongs exclusively to the States. Here, again, we are met
with the theory that the Government of the United States does not rest upon the
soil and territory of the country. Ve think that this theory is founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of that Government. We hold it to
be an incontrovertible principle, that the Government of the United States may, by
means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot
of American soil, the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep
the peace to that extent."
"This power to enforce its laws, and to execute its functions in all places, does
not derogate from the power of the State to execute its laws, at the same time, and
in the same places. The one does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be executed at the same time. In that case, the words of the Constitution itself show which is to yield. 'This Constitution, and all laws which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, shall * * * be the supreme law of the land.'" (zoo U. S.
394-5.)

And again"The argument is based on a strained and impracticable view of the nature and
powers of the National Government. It must execute its powers, or it is no governent. It must execute them on the land as well as on the sea, on things aswell
as on persons. And, to do this, it must necessarily have the powerto command
obedience, to preserve order and keep the'peace; and noperson orpower in thisland
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has the right to resistor question its authority,so long as it keefis within the bound
of its jurisdiction." (Id- 396.)

The power to keep the peace is a police power, and the
United States has the power to keep the peace in matters affecting its sovereignty. There can be no doubt, then, that
the jurisdiction of the United States is not affected by reason
of the place-the locality-where the homicide occurred. If
the locality is a necessary element of jurisdiction, a majority
of the offenses created by the statutes would be out of their
jurisdiction, and the statutes creating such offenses would be
nullities, and practically useless.
For example, for a quarter of a century, the United States
Courts in this State were held in rented buildings, owned by
private parties. They had no jurisdiction over them, under the
provision of Section 8, Article I, of the National Constitution;
and no jurisdiction other than that had over other portions of
the country to which the Constitution and its laws extended.
Had an assault been committed in open Court upon the Judge,
in one of these buildings, and the assailing party been slain by
the Marshal, in protecting the Judge, under circumstances excusing or justifying the homicide, would it be pretended that
the Court would have no jurisdiction to protect him from interference by the State Government? Or, have the United
States and its courts no jurisdiction over the offense of resisting a United States Marshal in the lawful execution of the
process of the courts ? 'or over the crime of counterfeiting the
coin or forging the bonds or other securities of the United
States, or other offenses against the laws, unless the offense is
committed in a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States? Such a claim would be preposterous.
In the case of Tennessee v. Davis (1879), tOO U. S. 257, the
defendant was indicted for murder in killing one Haynes, while
he was engaged in discharging his duties as a Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue of the United States, which killing
Davis claimed was in self defense. The case was removed to
the Circuit Court of the United States under Section 643, Rev.
Stat. It was contended that this Act was an encroachment
upon State rights, since it took away the right of the State to
determine and execute its own criminal laws, and was, there-
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fore, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court sustained the Act.
It was held "that the United States is a government with authority extending over all the territory of. the Union, acting
upon the State and the people of the State." In deciding the
case the Court said"As was said in ,11arlin v. Ihnter (1816), 1 Wheat. (14 U. S.) 363, the ' General Government must cease to exist whenever it loses the power of protecting itself in the exercise of its Constitutional powers.' It can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act within the States. If, when thus acting, and
within the scope of their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to
trial in a State Court, for an alleged offense against the laws of the State, yet warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the General Government is
powerless to interfere at once for their protection; if their protection must be left
to the action of the State Court-the operations of the General Government may
at any time be arrested at the will of one of its members. The legislation of a
State may be unfiiendly. It may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate
direction of the National Government, and in obedience to its laws. It may deny
the authority conferred by those laws. The State Court may administer not only
the laws of the State, but equally Federal law, in such a manner as to paralyze the
operations of the Government. And even if, after trial and final judgment in the
State Court, a case can be brought into the United States Court for review, the officer is -,iithdrawnfroin the diseha.;e of his dul , duringthe fendenc), if the trosecution, and the exercise of acknowledged Federalipowerarrsted."
"We do not think such an element of weakness is to be found in the Constitution. The United States is a government with authority extending over the whole
territory of the Union, acting upon the States and upon the people of the States.
While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its sovereignty extends it
is supreme. No State government can exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against
its will, or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any subject which
that instrument has committed to it." Tennessee v. Davis (1879), 1oo U. S.
262-3.

These expositions of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction
of the General Government are authoritative and conclusive,
and the result is that, wherever the Constitution and laws of
the United States operate at all, the State laws in conflict with
them are subordinate, and those of the United States are
supreme and paramount.
Numerous cases are reported in the books, wherein parties
arrested for offenses under the State laws, for acts performed
in the discharge of duties imposed by the laws of the United
States, have been discharged from imprisonment on habeas
corp s by the United States Courts, in consonance with these
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principles, now authoritatively established by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the cases cited, and others in
the same line.
Thus, in Ex parte Jenkins, and others (1853), 2 Wall, Jr., 521,
Deputy United States Marshals, who were arrested on the
warrant of a justice of the peace in Pennsylvania, for shooting
and wounding a negro, who resisted an arrest attempted under
a warrant issued by the United States Court for a fugitive
slave, Mr. Justice Grier, of the United States Circuit Court,
took jurisdiction and discharged the petitioners, under the Act
of 1835, since carried into the Revised Statutes, as part of section 753, under which this case arises. After their discharge,
they were arrested again, in a suit by the negro for trespass,
upon a warrant issued by a judge of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, and again discharged on habeas corpts by the
United States Circuit Court. After this they were indicted for
the shooting and wounding of the negro, by the grand jury of
Luzerne County, and a third time released on habeas corpus.
In the first of these cases Mr. Justice GRIER observes"What, then, have we power to do, on the return of the writ ?" "The writ of
habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ known to the common law: the great
object of which is the liberation of those who may be in prison without sufficient
cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment. It brings the body of the prisoner up, together with the cause of his
commitment. The Court can, undoubtedly, inquire into the sufficiency of that
cause." * * *
1"Warrants of arrest issued on the application of private
informers, may show on their face a prinza facie charge sufficient to give jurisdiction to the justice; but it may be founded on mistake, ignorance, malice, or perjury.
To put a case very similar to the present-A tells B that he has seen C kill D.
B runs off to a justice, swears to the murder boldly, without any knowledge of the
facts, and takes out a warrant for C, who is arrested and imprisoned in consequence
thereof. C prays a habeas corpus, and shows that he was the sheriff of the
county, and hanged D in pursuance of a legal warrant. If a Court could not discharge a prisoner in such a case, because the warrant was regular on its face, the
writ of habeas corpus is of little use."
"The authority conferred on the judges of the United States by this Act of
Congress gives them all the power that any other Court could exercise under the
writ of habeas corpus, or gives them none at all. If under such a writ they may
not discharge their officer, when imprisoned I by any authority,' for an act done in
pursuance of a law of the United States, it would be impossible to discover for
what useful purpose the Act was passed. Is the prisoner to be brought before them
only that they may acknowledge their utter impotence to protect him ?"
/
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In Ex parte Robinson (1855), 6 McLean 355, Mr. Justice
held that "a writ of habeas corpus may issue to relieve an officer of the Federal Government who has been imprisoned under State authority for the performance of his
duty." In the course of the decision the learned Justice observesMCLEAN

"It is a general principle of law, to which I know of no exception, that the
laws of every government shall be construed by itself; and such construction is
acted upon by the judiciary of all other countries. By the Federal Constitution,
'the judicial power of the United States is declared to be ve~ted in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time order
and establi.-h.' Under this provision, the judiciary of the Union gives a construction to the laws which is obligatory on the State tribunals. The Constitution again
declares, ' the Constitution and laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.' " (Id. 362.)

Thus, it is the exclusive prerogative of the National Courts
to finally determine, whether an act performed by one of the
officers of the United States, and especially an officer of the
Court itself, is done in pursuarce of a law of the United States,
or whether, when under arrest for acts performed in connection with his office, he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law of the United States."
In the case of U. S. ex rel. Roberts v.Jailerof Fayette County,
K-ntucky (1867), 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265, a special Deputy United
States Marshal was arrested, under the State laws, on a charge
of murder, for a homicide committed by him in attempting to
arrest one Cull upon a warrant issued by a Commissioner of
the United States Circuit Court, for offenses charged to have
been committed under the internal revenue laws. Upon the hearing, the United States Circuit Court found that the homicide
was committed in the performance of "an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of a process of a
Court or Judge of the same," and discharged the petitioner.
The question of the jurisdiction of the Court, and the facts,
were elaborately discussed.
So, In re Ramsey (1879), 2 Flip. 451, the prisoner was a

Deputy United States Marshal, in custody by order of a State

604.
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Court, on a charge of murder, the homicide having been
committed in an attempt to arrest, upon a warrant issued by
the United States Courts, the party slain. The Court found
that the act was done in pursuance of a law of the United
States; that petitioner was justified in the act which he performed, and discharged him. See, also to the same effect, In
re Neill (1871), 8 Blatch. 156, 167; In reFarrand(1867),I
Abb. (U. S.) 14o ; Electoral College of South Carolina(I876), I
Hugh. C. Ct. 571: In .re Hurst (1879), 2 Flip. 51o, and cases
collected in vol. 29 Myers, Fed. Decisions, 698. Thus it appears
to be settled, beyond controversy, that, where a party is in
custody by State authority, for an act done, or omitted to be
done, in pursuance of any specific provision of a statute of the
United States, imposing a duty upon him, or for an act performed justifiable by the circumstances of the case, in order to
enable him to perform that duty, or in the execution of any
order, or process, or decree, of a Court of the United States,
or of a Judge thereof, the Courts of the United States have
jurisdiction to discharge him on habeas corpus, under Section
753 of the Revised Statutes. In such a case, the laws of the
United States are supreme, and the act cannot be an offense
against the laws of the State, and as we have before seen,
whether an act is performed in pursuance of a law of the United
States, is a question exclusively for the United States Courts
to authoritatively and conclusively determine. They must interpret finally the laws of the United States. With their decision the State cannot interfere. When the United States
Courts have spoken on the subject, the State has nothing
more to do with it.
The only remaining questions to determine are:
I. Was the homicide now in question, committed by petitioner, while acting in discharge of a duty imposed upon him
by th Constitution or laws of the United States, within the
meaning of Section 753 of the Revised Statutes?
2. Was the homicide necessary, or was it reasonably apparent to the mind of the petitioner, at the time, and under the
circumstances then existing, that the killing was necessary in
order to a full and complete discharge of such duty?
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It is urged that there is no statute, which, specifically, makes
it the duty of a Marshal, or a Deputy Marshal, to protect the
Judges of the United States Courts while out of the courtroom, traveling from one point to another in the circuit, on
official business, from the violence of litigants, who have become offended at adverse decisions made by such Judges in
the performance of their judicial duties, and that Marshals, or
deputies, so engaged, are not within the provisions of Section
753 of the Revised Statutes.
It will be observed that the language of the provision of
Section 753 is "an act done * * * in pursuance of a law
of the United States," not in pursuance of a statute of the
United States.
The statutes of Congress, in their express provisions, do not
present all the law of the United States. Their incidents and
implications are as much a part of the law, as their express
provisions. When they prescribe duties, provide for the accomplishment of certain designated objects, or confer authority
in general terms, they carry with them all the powers essential
to effect the ends designed.

[See note on page 624.]

Says the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Davis (1879), 100
U. S. 264, quoting with approbation from Chief Justice
MARSHALL"' It is not unusual for a legislative act to involve consequences which are not
expressed. _An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not
necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this
order. His security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual thing for an
Act of Congress to imply, without expressing, this very exemption from State control. * * * The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the
mint establishment, and all those institutions which are public -in their nature, are
examples in point. It has never been doubted thatall who are employed in them
are protected while in the line of their duty; and yet this protection is not expressed in any Act of Congress. It is incidental to, and is implied, in the several
acts by which those institutions are created; and is secured to the individuals employed in them by the judicial power alone-that is, the judicial power is the instrument employed by the Government in administering this security.'"

k
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the duty which it is now claimed devolved exclusively upon
himself, or some other peace officer of the State.
Had the United States in this instance relied upon another
government-the State of California-to keep the peace as to
one of their most venerable and distinguished officers-one
of the Judges of their highest Court-in relation to matters
concerning the performance of his official duties, they would
have leaned upon a broken reed, and there would now in
all probability be a vacancy on the bench of one of the most
august judicial tribunals in the world, and the deceasedthe would-be assassin-might, perhaps, be a tenant of the
Stockton jail, to be disposed of by another government. The
case affords a striking illustration of the necessity for the
United States to protect their own officers while in the discharge of their duties, and by such protection, protect the
Nation itself
The result was, that instead of arresting the conspirator in
the contemplated murder-the wife of the deceased, armed
with a loaded revolver till relieved of it by a citizen-threatening death to Justice FIELD, calling upon the bystanders to aid
her, and attempting to enter the car, with the avowed purpose
of compassing his death, the officer of the United States
assigned by his Government to the special duty of protecting
the Justice's life against these very parties, while in the actual
performance of the duties so assigned him, was, himself,
arrested, without warrant, and disarmed by an inferior officer
of the State, and interrupted in the discharge of those momentous duties, thereby leaving his charge helpless, and without
the protection provided by the Government he was serving, at
a time when such protection seemed most needed.
Had Neagle been a Deputy Sheriff of San Joaquin County,
assigned by his superior to this very duty of protecting the life
of Justice FIELD, under the State laws, and, in the performance
of his duties, committed the homicide in all other respects
under precisely the same circumstances, would he have been
arrested by the constable of Lathrop, without a warrant, and
disarmed with such inconsiderate haste, and thereby prevented
from further performing his duty to protect the life and person
of Justice FIELD, leaving him to pursue the remainder of his
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journey without protection? Yet the constable was informed
that Neagle was acting as a Deputy United States Marshal,
under the orders of his superiors, for the protection of the
life and person of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
We do not wish to be regarded as now calmly and deliberately looking back upon the scene, and sitting in judgment
upon the action of the constable, or as passing censure upon
his zeal. He, doubtless, in the emergency, where time for
consideration was short, and the facts not fully appreciated,
acted according to the best dictates of his judgment, necessarily hastily formed. But when the State now comes in, after
an arrest upon a warrant issued upon such flimsy testimony as
that presented, and deliberately claims the exclusive right to
sit in judgment upon the acts of the United States Deputy
Marshal, performed not upon his own interpretation of the law,
but upon that of the Attorney-General of the United States,
who may be presumed to possess some knowledge of his
powers and duties, it is well to consider the circumstances from
a standpoint presenting a view of both sides of the question.
In matters of the public peace, in which the National Government is concerned, the Marshals and Deputy Marshals,
within the scope of their authority, are Nationalpeaceoffcers,
with all the statutory and common law powers appertaining to
peace officers. Is not the National public peace involved, when
a deadly assault is unexpectedly made upon a Judge in open
Court, in which the Marshal and his deputies, seeing the
assault, are both authorized and bound on their own motion,
without any previous order or command, to interpose and use
sufficient force to quell the disturbance, and subdue the parties
making it? Yet where is there any specific provision of the
statute imposing that duty upon them? The Marshal is required to attend Court, but it is not provided what he shall do
in Court. To what end shall he be in Court if not to keep
order, and, if necessary, to protect the judges from violence,
by force, or any practicable means? But there is no statute
requiring it in terms.
The general duties of Marshals are provided for in Section
787, which reads as follows-
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,'It shall be the duty of the Marshal of each district to attend the District and
Circuit Courts when sitting therein, and execute throughout the district, all lawful
precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States; and
be shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his
duty."

There is no more authority specifically conferred upon the
Marshal by this section, to protect the Judge from assassination, in open Court, without a specific order or command, than
there is to protect him out of Court, when on the way from
one Court to another, in the discharge of his official duties.
And the assassination in Court, as well as out of it, might well
be accomplished before the Judge would be aware of his
danger, and before it would be possible to give a command or
order to the Marshal for his protection. The authority exists
in the one case, as in the other, from the nature of the office,
and the powers arising under the common law, recognized and
in use in the country, and, in the nature of things, inherent in the
office. The very idea of a government composed of executive,
legislative and judicial departments, necessarily comprehends
the power to do all things through its appropriate officers and
agents, within the scope of its general governmental purposes
and powers requisite to preserve its existence, protect it and
its ministers and give it complete efficiency in all its parts. It
necessarily and inherently includes power in its executive department to enforce the laws, keep the national peace with
regard to its officers while in the line of their duty, and protect, by its all-powerful arm, all the other departments and the
officers and instrumentalities necessary to their efficiency, while
engaged in the discharge of their duties.
In language attributed to Mr. ex-Secretary Bayard, used
with reference to this very case, which we quote, not as a controlling judicial authority, but for its intrinsic, sound, common
sense"The robust and essential principle must be recognized and proclaimed, that
the inherent powers of every government which is sufficient to authorize and enforce
the judgment of its courts, are, equally, and at all times, and in all places, sufficient to protect the individual judge, who, fearlessly and conscientiously in the
discharge of his duty, pronounces those judgments."

Our jurisprudence is derived from and founded upon that of
England, and our judges and officers are substantially the
VOL. XXXVII.-3 9
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same. They have corresponding duties imposed upon them,
and inherently possess corresponding executive powers, to
enable them to effectively perform their duties. From the
foundation of our Government, many of their common law duties have'been performed, and common law powers exercised,
without specific or statutory direction, and without question;
and the common law principles governing them, except so far
as inapplicable, or modified by statute, still remain in force.
The observation of the Supreme Court of California, in the
Estate of Apple (1885), 66 Cal. 432, in which State a Code has
been adopted, with respect to the common law not abrogated
or modified by the Code, is applicable here. Said the Court"The Code establishes the law of this State respecting the subjects to which it
relates; but this, of course, does not mean that there is no law with respect to such
subjects except that embodied in the Code. When the Code speaks, its provisions
are controlling, and they are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect its objects and promote justice-the rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed, having been abolished here; but where the
Code is silent, the common law governs."

So here, where the duties of the Marshal are not limited, or
specifically defined, by the statute, we must look to the powers
and duties of sheriffs at common law for them, so far as those
duties come within the purposes and powers of the National
Government.
There are many acts and duties daily performed by the Marshals, and by other officers, that are not specifically pointed out
or defined by the statute. The Marshals are in daily attendance upon the Judges, and performing official duties in their
chambers. Yet no statute specifically points out those duties
or requires their performance. Indeed, no such places as
chambers for the Circuit Judges, or Circuit Justices, are mentioned at all in the statutes. The Judges' chambers do not appear to have any "local habitation." The Justices of the Supreme Court at Washington have, in fact, no chambers otherwise than as they study and do their work out of Court, at
rooms in their own residences. We have in the San Francisco
Courthouse rooms that we call chambers, in which the work of
the Judges out of Court is in part, but not wholly, performed.
I apprehend that the Marshal would as clearly be authorized
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to protect the Judges here in chambers as in the courtroom.
All business done out of Court by the Judge, is called chaniber business. But it is not necessary to be done in what is
usually called chambers. Chamber business may be done, and
often is done, on the street, in the Judge's own house, at the
hotel where he stops, when absent from home, or it may be
done in trdnsitu, on the cars in going from one place to another, within the proper jurisdiction to hold court. Mr. Justice
FIELD could, as well, and as authoritatively, issue a temporary
injunction, grant a writ of habeas corpus, an order to show
cause, 6r do any other chamber business for the district, in the
dining-room at Lathrop, or in the cars, as at his chambers in San
Francisco, or in the courtroom. He could have made a writ
of habeas corpus returnable before himself on the car, and lawfully heard and decided the case while on his passage to San
Francisco. The chambers of the Judge, where chambers are
provided, are not an element of jurisdiction, but are a convenience to the Judge, and to suitors-places, where the Judge
at proper times can be readily found, and the business conveniently transacted. But the chambers of the Judge, as a legal
entity, are something of a myth. For the purposes of jurisdiction, the chambers of the Judge are wherever he happens to
be in his circuit, or district, when the exigencies of the case
call for the transaction of chamber business, and a Judge is as
clearly engaged in the discharge of the duties of his office,
when going from one place of holding court to another, for the
purpose of holding court, and just as much entitled to protection from his own government against murderous or other assaults, from desperate suitors, on account of his judicial action,
as when actually engaged in business at chambers, or in holding court. In England, whence we derive our jurisprudence,
the High Sheriff of the shire was the keeper of the King's
peace-that is to say, the keeper of the peace of the sovereignty which the King represents. So here, I take it, under
the authorities cited, the Marshal is the keeper of the peace of
the Government of the sovereignty he serves, within the scope
of the supreme powers of that Government. In England, in
early days, it was the duty, in every shire, of the sheriffs not
only to attend the courts, but to attend the Judges through
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their circuits. They met the Judges at the border of the shire,
and attended them until they left it at the border of another:
Dalton, on the Office and Authority of Sheriffs, cbapter 98, p.
369, published in I682. See also 40 Alb. Law Journal, 161.
Such is also understood to have been the practice in early days
in a number of the States. From the advancing state of civilization this practice has, doubtless, generally become unnecessary for the safety of the Judges, and it has fallen into desuetude. But it does not follow that the power to thus protect
them has been abolished or become extinguished. It simply
remains latent or dormant, ready to be called into action whenever the exigencies of the case or times require it. And how
could there possibly be a more urgent occasion for reviving the
practice and calling it into action, than the recent journey of
Justice FIELD to Los Angeles and return on official business ?
Upon general, immutable principles, the power must necessarily be inherent in the executive department of any government worthy the name of government, to protect itself in all
matters to which its authority extends, and this necessarilyinvolves the power to protect all the agencies and instrumentalities necessary to accomplish the objects and purposes of
that government. In the National Government of the United
States, the judiciary constitutes one of its most important
branches. Unlike the judiciary of other nations, it is invested
with the jurisdiction to pass, finally and conclusively, upon the
powers of the legislative and executive departments of the
Government, and to confine them within their constitutional
limits. It is, therefore, the balance wheel of the National Government, that keeps it running regularly and smoothly within
its proper domain. Impotent, indeed, must be the executive
branch of the Government, if it is not empowered to protect
the lives of the Judges of the highest branch of its judiciary,
from assault and assassination, on account of their judicial decisions, by desperate disappointed litigants, while passing from
point to point within their territorial jurisdiction in the discharge of their high functions and duties. We cannot think
the power can be wanting, even if there were no constitutional
or statutory provision governing the case. It seems impossible that the National Government should be left to the mercy,
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good will, or complacency of the State, to afford that protection to its Judges, that the United States, if worthy to be called
a Nation, are bound themselves to furnish.
As a further example of laws, not ordained by specific statutory enactments, see those respecting punishment for contempts. For forty years after the organization of the National
Government, down to 183 1, there was no statute which specifically defined contempts of court: Eazparte Robinson (1873),
19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 5 1o; Erparte Tcr y(iSSS), 128 U. S. 302-3;
Ex- parte Savin (888), 131 Id. 275. But the courts, nevertheless, exercised the power, necessarily, from the nature of
things inherent in every court, to protect itself, its dignity and
its officers, by the punishment of many acts as contempts of
its authority. The first specific Act upon the subject passed
by Congress, was not an Act enlarging the power of the court,
but it was, on the contrary, a restriction of the powers already
exercised within certain defined limits. The act was passed at
the instance of Senator Buchanan, to limit the power of the
court theretofore exercised, to punish for contempts, as a sequel to the impeachment of a United States Judge for the District of Missouri. The Act was passed March 2, 1831, and is
entitled, "An Act declaratory of the lav concerning Contempts
of Court :" 4 U. S. Stat. at Large, 487. The first section does
not grantthe power to punish for contempts, but expressly
recognizes the existing power, and, in express terms, thereafter
limits the power to certain enumerated cases. In order that
those who were before subject to punishment for contempt
should not escape the penalties due their acts, section 2 of the
statute makes certain acts, before punishable as contempts,
offenses against the laws of the United States, punishable by
the less summary and more deliberate proceeding on indictment and trial by a jury. Many of the acts under that Act
recognized as punishable as contempts, as being necessary to
the prompt and summary vindication of the authority of the
court, are also indictable offenses under other statutes.
This statute of 1831 has been carried into the Revised
Statutes, Section I of that Act having been re-enacted in Section 725 of the Revised Statutes, giving it a granting, as well
as a restricting form, but in no sense changing its purpose or
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meaning. And Section 2 is now found in Section 5399 of the
Revised Statutes, as a part of the criminal code of the Nation.
Did anybody ever doubt, or does anybody now doubt, that
the power of the United States Courts to punish contempts,
from the organization of the Government down to 1831, was
just as ample, and that it was just as much a part of the law of
the United States, inherently vested in the Courts, as it was
after the passage of the Act of 1831, or as it is now under-the
same provisions carried into the Revised Statutes?
Yet there was no specific provision of the statutes defining
contempts. It was a power, however, necessarily inherent in
the Courts. It is involved in the very idea of a Court, having
power to administer the laws of the land. It would be impossible for Courts to perform their functions and administer
the laws without it. And as so inherent, the power to punish
various acts not mentioned for contempt was as much a part
of the law of the United States as if ordained by a specific provision of the Statutes of the United States, and the authority of
the Marshal to protect the Judges is a cognate power, also
necessarily inherent in the office he holds.

Thus there is

much law of the United States, not now found in terms in
the Statutes, but as valid and binding upon the people, and
upon the States, as if it were specifically and definitely therein
expressed. See U. S. v. Hudson (I812), 7 Cranch (II U. S.)
32-4; 3Matter of Meador (1869), I Abb. (U. S.) 324; 1n re
Buckle , (1886), 69 Cal. I8.
But we are not without constitutional and statutory provisions, broad enough and specific enough, as we think, to
cover the case. The National Constitution, providing a government for sixty-five millions of people, covers but a very few
pages, but it seems to be amply sufficient for the purposes
intended. In prescribing the duties of the President, in the
terse but comprehensive language of Section 3, Article II, it
provides that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." This makes him the executive head of the Nation,
and gives him all the authority necessary to accomplish the
purposes intended-all the authority necessarily inherent in
the office, not otherwise limited. Congress, in pursuance of
powers vested in it, has provided for seven departments, as
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subordinate to the President, to aid him in performing the
executive functions conferred upon him. Section 346, Rev.
Stat., provides that one of the executive departments shall be
"known as the Department of Justice," and that there shall be
"an Attorney-General, who shall be the head thereof" He
has general supervision of the executive branch of the National
Judiciary, and Section 362 provides, as a portion of his powers
and duties, that-:
"The Attorney-General shall exercise general superintendence and direction
over the Attorneys and Marshals of all the districts of the United States and Territories as to the manner of discharging their respective duties; and the several
District Attorneys and Marshals are required to report to the Attorney-General an
account of their official proceedings, and of the state and condition of their respective offices, in such time and manner as the Attorney-General may direct."

Section 788, Rev. Stat., provides that",The Marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same power
in executing the laws of the United States, as the sheriffs and their deputies in
such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof."

By Section 817 of the Penal Code of this State, the sherif"
is a "peace officer." By section 4176, Pol. Code, he is "tc
preserve the peace" and "prevent and suppress breaches of the
peace." The Marshal is, therefore, in accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court already referred to, and under
the provisions of the statute above cited, "a peace officer," so
far as keeping the peace, in any matter wherein the National
powers of the United States are concerned, and as to such
matters he has all the powers of the sheriff, as a peace officer,
under the laws of the State. He is, in such matters, "to preserve the peace" and "prevent and suppress breaches of the
peace." An assault upon, or an assassination of, a Judge of a
United States Court, while engaged in any matter pertaining
to his official duties, on account, or by reason, of his judicial
decisions, or action in performing his official duties, is a breach
of the peace, affecting the authority and interests of the
United States, and within the jurisdiction and power of the
Marshal, or his deputies, to prevent, as a peace officer of the
National Government. Such an assault is not merely an assault upon the person of the Judge, as a man. It is an assault
upon the National Judiciary, which he represents, and through
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it an assault upon the authority of the Nation itself. It is,
necessarily, a breach of the National peace. As a National
peace officer, under the conditions indicated, it is the duty of
the Marshal and his deputies to prevent a breach of the National
peace by an assault upon the authority of the United States,
in the person of a Judge of its highest Court, while in the
discharge of his duty. If this be not so, in the language of
the Supreme Court before cited, "Why do'we have Marshals
at all?" What useful functions can they perform in the economy of the National G)vernment?
The Constitution of the United States provides for a Supreme Court, with jurisdiction more extensive in some particulars than that conferred on any other national judicial tribunal.
If the Executive Department of the Government cannot protect one of these Judges, while in the discharge of his duty,
from assassination, by dissatisfied suitors, on account of his
judicial action, then it cannot protect any of them, and all the
members of the Court may be killed, and the Court itself exterminated, and the laws of the Nation by reason thereof, remain unadministe'ed and unexecuted. The power and duty
imposed on the President to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed," necessarily carries with it all power and authority necessary to accomplish the object sought to be attained, and, certainly, the power and duty to protect from the
deadly assaults of desperate suitors, the lives of the Judges
of the highest Court in the Nation, while engaged in the lawful discharge of their duties.
As we have before seen, neither Constitution nor Statutes
can, or do, anticipate and point out, specifically, every possible
right or duty to be covered and secured. They must, necessarily, be general. In the passage already cited from Tennessee v. Davis, the Supreme Court, in speaking of certain officers, says"It has never been doubted, that all who are employed in them are protected
while in the line of their duty; and yet this protection is not expressed in any Act
of Congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts by which those
institutions are created; and is secured to the individuals employed in them by the
judicial power alone ; that is, the judicial power is the instrument employed by the
Government in administering this security." (ioo U. S. 265.)
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And in United States v. Nacdaniel (1833), 7 Pet. (32 U. S.)
Said the Court-

14, similar views were expressed.

" A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of the
Government must convince every person that the head of a department, in the distribution of its duties and responsibilities, is often compelled to exercise his discretion. He is limited in the exercise of his powers by law; but it does not follow
that he must show a statutory provision for every thing he does. No government
could e administeredon such princifles. * * * There are nunerless things
which must be done, that can neither be anticipatednor defined, and 'which are
essentialto the properaction of the Government."

These observations are especially and forcibly applicable to
the terse but very comprehensive provisions of the Constitution
and of the several statutes cited, as to the powers and duties
of the President, the Attorney-General and Marshals.
The act of the Attorney-General in directing the United
States Marshal to protect the life of Mr. Justice FIELD against
the assaults of the deceased and his wife, is, in legal contemplation, the act of the President. The President speaks and
acts through the heads of the several executive departments, in
relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties.
They are but the subordinates of the President, wielding his
power: Wilcox v.Jackson(i839),13 Pet. (3 8U. S.) 513 ; United
States v. Cutter (1856), 2 Curt. C. Ct. 617. In the former case,
relating to a reservation of land by the Secretary of War, the
Court said"Now, although the immediate agent in requiring this reservation was the Secretary of War, yet we feel justified in presuming that it was done by the approbation and direction of the President. The President speaks and acts through the
heads of the several departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their
respective duties."

See also 7 Attorney-General's Opinions, 480-1, Id. 433-479;
Confiscation cases (1873), 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) io8-9; United
States v. Eliason (1842), 16 Pet. (4I U. S.) 291.
By Section 788 Rev. Stat., and the several provisions of the
Statutes of California herein cited, the United States Marshal
is made a peace officer, and as such he is authorized to preserve
the peace, so far as a breach of the peace affects the authority
of the United States and obstructs the operations of the Government and its various departments. The Courts must, from
the nature of things, be enabled fully to perform all their func-
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tions imposed upon them by the Constitution and laws, without
hindrance or obstruction, and they must have the inherent
power to protect themselves by and through their executive
officers, under the direction and supervision of the AttorneyGeneral and the President, against obstruction and hindrance
in the performance of their judicial duties. An assault upon a
Judge in Court, or a Judge out of Court, while in the performance of his duty, induced by his judicial action, and intended
or calculated to obstruct him in, or deter him from, a free and
full discharge of his duty, is a breach of the National peace
affecting the sovereignty of the Nation, and tending to obstruct
and impair the operations and efficiency of one of the most
important departments of the Government. As such, it is the
duty of the United States Marshal, under the police powers of
the Nation so conferred upon him, by the statutes cited, and as
a National peace officer, to prevent such breach of the peace.
Under the State laws, deputy sheriffs, when occasion requires,
constables and police officers of cities are assigned to certain
districts, to watch over the safety of the citizens and to guard
and protect their persons and property from assault, destruction or injur)-i'l s/wi-, to prevent the commission1 of crimes, etc.
Thce-e officers in cities are found everywhere, night and day,
guarding the citizen and his property from injury. So, the
Attorney-General, under the provisions of the statute cited, and
the President under the provisions of the Constitution, requiring him to see that the laws are faithfully executed, are authorized and empowered to direct the assignment by the Marshal,
of any deputy, to perform any special National police duty
within his jurisdiction, arising out of the statutes, whether by
express provision or necessary implication, and under any
power, necessarily inherent in the President and Government,
in order to give full effect and efficiency to the Government, or
any of its departments. It has never, so far as we are advised,
been doubted that a Marshal, or Deputy Marshal, is authorized
to protect a Judge and preserve order in open Court, even by
the use of force, without any special order or command, as a
part of the duties necessarily.inherent in his office; yet, as we
have already seen, there is no more specific statutory authority
for so preserving order, and protecting the Judge in Court, than
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for- performing the same duty, under proper conditions, for a
Judge engaged in performing his duties, of whatever nature,
out of Court.
It is argued by one of the counsel on behalf of the State that
these matters pertain exclusively to the peace of the State, and
that the State. has not only power to preserve the public peace,
but that it is amply capable of performing this service; that it
is its duty to do it; that the threats of the deceased were matt~rs of public notoriety; and that by calling the powers of the
State into action, Justice FIELD's life might have been protected by the State, and there would have been no necessity
whatever for what is called on the part of the State, the illegal
action of the United States Marshal. It may be conceded, and
it is undoubtedly true, that it was an imperative duty of the
State to preserve the public peace, and to amply protect the
life of Mr. Justice FIELD, but it did not do it. Where Would
Mr. Justice FIELD have been to-day, had he relied solely upon
the State to perform her conceded imperative duty?
Not having performed that obligation while on his journey
in discharge of his judicial duties, does a complaint now come
with a good grace from the State, against the United States,
for performing it for her, as well as for the National Government, by protecting one of its most distinguished judicial
functionaries through one of its own officers, in the only
manner in which it could have been effectively performed ?
In the present case, and on this official journey, there was a
necessity for the kind of protection afforded Mr. Justice FIELD,
for no other kind would have been adequate. The occasion
required a preventive remedy.
The use of the State police force would have been impracticable, as the powers of the sheriff would have ended at the
borders of his county, and of other township and city peace
officers, at the boundaries of their respective townships and
cities. Only a United States Marshal, or his deputy, could
exercise these official functions throughout the United States
judicial district, and, as we have seen, the powers exercised
concern matters affecting the peace of the National Government, and if the National Government has no authority to act
in the premises, it certainly ought to have such power.
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The only remedy suggested on the part of the State, was to
arrest the deceased and hold him to bail to keep the peace
under Section 706 of the Penal Code, the highest limit of the
amount of bail being $5ooo. But although the threats are
conceded to have been publicly known in the State, no State
officer took any means to provide this flimsy safeguard.
Perhaps counsel intended to intimate that it was not the
duty of the State, but of Mr. Justice FIELD himself, to set in
motion proceedings under the law furnished by the State, to
put the decedent under bonds to, keep the peace. Has it
come tu this, then, that. a Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, when in obedience to the behests of the law, he
comes to California to perform his judicial duties, must submit
to the humiliation of immediately upon his arrival, stealing
away to some justice of the peace and instituting proceedings
to bind over to keep the peace, vindictive and dangerous
litigants who have threatened his life? But what security to
Mr. Justice FIELD would a bond of $5ooo afford against resolute, violent and desperate parties, for whom the penalties for
murder have no deterring power? The United States Marshal, the United States Attorney for the District of California,
the Attorney-General of the United States at Washington,
and the mass of the people of California, thought that the exigencies of the occasion required something more, and the
result fully justified their view of the matter.
Although no adequate means of protection were afforded by
the State on his late official journey, and Mlr. Justice FIELD
would, in all probability, not now be among the living, had not
the petitioner, by the wise forethought of the AttorneyGeneral, been detailed to protect his life, yet the fact of the
failure of the State to perform its duty does not afford any
reason for taking the petitioner out of the custody of the State,
unless, in committing the homicide, he was engaged in the
performance of "an act done * * * in pursuance of a
law of the United States," and the killing was justifiable.
The failure to perform its duty would not, alone, oust the
jurisdiction of the State, if it be exclusive. But since the
possible remedy mentioned under the State law was alluded
to by counsel as ample, we refer to it as illustrating the neces-
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sity for a speedy amendment of the laws of the United States,
if they are now so defective as to afford no protection to the
United States Judges in the performance of their high functions.
It is apparent to us, if he is not now so protected, that the
distinguished Justice allotted to the Ninth Circuit, and also his
associates, should have thrown over them the protecting egis
of the laws of that Government which he has so long, faithfully
and efficiently served.
After mature consideration, we have reached the conclusion
that the homicide in question was committed by petitioner
while acting in the discharge of a duty imposed upon him by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, within the meaning of the provisions of Section 753 of the Revised Statutes.
It only remains to inquire, secondly, was the homicide necessary, or was it reasonably apparent to the mind of the petitioner, at the time and under the circumstances then existing,
that the killing was necessary in order to a full and complete
discharge of such duty?
The answer to this proposition is really included in the answer to the last, but we desire to make some observations
bearing especially upon it.
The Attorney-General and counsel for the State declined to
discuss the question as to whether the homicide was justifiable, because, in their view, this is a question solely for the
State Courts, the case, as claimed by them, not being within
the provisions of Section 753 of the Revised Statutes, and,
therefore, not within the jurisdiction of this Court. Holding
as we do, that the case falls within those provisions, so far as
the petitioner was authorized to act by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, it becomes necessary to determine
whether the homicide was justifiable. For, if it was malicious,
wanton or reckless, without any reasonable apparent necessity
in order to fully and properly perform his duty of protecting
Justice FIELD, then it was an act performed beyond and outside his duty, and he is amenable to the State Courts.
The facts set forth in the petition, and in the traverse to the
return of the Sheriff, are fully and satisfactorily proved by the
testimony, and whether we determine the case upon demurrer
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to the traverse, or upon the whole case, as presented in the
record and evidence, the result must be the same.
Were the question of justification to be determined by the
laws of the State of California, or in the State Courts, there
could be no ground for doubt. Says the Penal Code" Iomicide is also justifiable when committed by any person when resisting
any attcnpt to murder any person, * * * or to do some greatbodily injury
uPdon any person." (Sec. 197, Penal Code.)

But we shall consider the question without reference to the
statute of California.
It is unnecessary to repeat the facts in full. When the deceased left his seat, some thirty feet distant, walked stealthily
down the passage in the rear of Justice FIELD and dealt the
unsuspecting jurist two preliminary blows, doubtless by way
of reminding him that the timefor vengcance had at last come,
Justice FIELD was already at the traditional "wall" of the
law. He was sitting quietly at a table, back to the assailant,
eating his breakfast, the side opposite being occupied by other
passengers, some of whom were women, similarly engaged.
When, in a dazed condition, he awoke to the reality of the
situation and saw the stalwart form of the deceased, with arm
drawn back for a final mortal blow, there was no time to get
under or over the table, had the law, under any circumstances.
required such an act for his justification. Neagle could not
seek a "wall" to justify his acts, without abandoning his
charge to certain death. When, therefore, he sprang to his
feet and cried, "Stop! I am an officer," and saw the powerful arm of the deceased, drawn back for the final deadly stroke,
instantly change its direction to his left breast, apparently
seeking his favorite weapon, the knife, and at the same time
heard the half-suppressed disappointed growl of recognition
of the man who, with the aid of half a dozen others, had
finally succeeded in disarming him of his knife at the courtfoom a year before, the supreme moment had come, or, at
least, with abundant reason, he thought so, and fired the fatal
shot. The testimony all concurs in showing this to be the state
of facts, and the almost universal consensus of public opinion
of the United States seems to justify the act. On that occasion,
a second, or two seconds, signified, at least, two valuable lives,

MATTER OF DAVID

NEAGLE.

and a reasonable degree of prudence would justify a shot one
or two seconds too soon, rather than a fraction of a second too
late. Upon our minds the evidence leaves no doubt whatever
that the homicide was fully justified by the circumstances.
We have seen in an Eastern law journal, but with its dis-.
approval, some adverse criticism upon the action of the
petitioner, attributed to a quarter ordinarily entitled to great
consideration and respect. But it is not for scholarly gentlemen of humane and peaceful instincts-gentlemen, who, in all
probability, never in their lives, saw a desperate man of stalwart frame and great strength in murderous action-it is not
for them sitting securely in their libraries, 3000 miles away,
looking backward over the scene, to determine the exact point
of time when a man in Neagle's situation should fire at his
assailant, in order to be justified by the law. It is not for them
to say that the proper time had not yet come. To such, in all
probability, the proper time would never come. Neagle on
the scene of action, facing the party making a murderous
assault, knowing by personal experience his physical powers,
and his desperate character; and by general reputation, his
life-long habit of carrying arms, his readiness to use them, and
his angry, murderous threats, and seeing his demoniac looks,
his stealthy assault upon Juitice FIELD from behind, and.
remembering the sacred trust committed to his chargeNeagle, in these trying circumstances, was the party to determine when the supreme moment for action had come, and if
he honestly acted with reasonable judgment and discrction,
the law justifies him, even if he erred. But who will have thc
courage to stand up in the presence of the facts developed by
the testimony in this case, and say that he fired the smallest
fraction of a second too soon ?
In our judgment he acted, under the trying circumstances
surrounding him, in good faith and with consummate courage,
judgment and discretion. The homicide was, in our opinion,
clearly justifiable in law, and in the forum of sound, practical
common sense--commendable. This being so, and the act
having been "done * .
* in pursuance of a law of the
United States," as we have already seen, it cannot be an offense
against, and he is not amenable to, the laws of the State.
Let the petitioner be discharged.
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NoTE.r-The report of this case, as
published immediately after its delivery,
is incorrect, as the third paragraph on
page 605 erroneously reads: "The
principles of the common law, so far as
they are applicable, and as they have
been recognized, arid as they are in
force under the Constitution, not modified or repealed by the National Stptutes,
and the usages generally long acted
upon, are as much a portion of the laws
of the United States, as are the Statutes
themselves. So, also, where the Statutes point out duties, provide .for the
accomplishment of many objects, or confer authority in general terms, they
carry with them, by implication, all the
powers, duties, exemptions, and authority necessary to carry out and accomplish
all the purposes and objects intended to
be secured thereby."
Note should also be made of the fact
that the Grand Jury of the countywhere
the assault upon Justice FIELD occurred,
did, after the discharge of Neagle by
the United States Court, make a report, finding the shooting of Terry to
have been intentional and deliberate, but
noting that Neagle had been taken from
the power of the State by process of
the United States Court, from whose
decision the Grand Jury inferred that
Neagle could not be tried in any Court.
As this case is likely to be a leading
case upon the rights and duties of the
officers and courts of the United States,
the following annotation is directed
chiefly towards a further presentation of
the authorities relied upon by the
learned Judge.
The opinion embraces two propositions concerning the power of the
United States Courts.
1. To inquire, by a h eas corftus
proceeding, into the detention of any
petitioner, and to discharge him from
any custody, if he is held in violation
of the Constitution of the United States.

2. To decide, in exclusion of the
State Courts, whether an act has been
done in pursuance of a law of the
United States.
Under the second head, the Courts
will decide, not only whether the act
was done in performance of a right or
duty, but also whether it was done in a
manner justified by the Constitution and
laws of the United States alone.
The logical order of presenting the
authorities having been, very naturally,
adopted by the learned Judge in his
opinion, the chronological order will
generally be pursued here, as indicating
from one of two pohtical stand-points,
the rise or the declaration of this truly
august and National power.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. at
L. 82), enacts: J x4. That either of
the justices of the Supreme Court, as
well as judges of the District Courts,
shall have power to grant writs of taeat
corpus, for the purpose of an inquiry
into the cause of commitment; Provied, That writs of habeascorturshall,
in no case, extend to prisoners in jail,
unless where they are in custody under
or by color of the authority of the
United States, or are committed for trial
before some court of the same, or are
necessary to be brought into court to
testif.
This section is now incorporated into.
sections 751, 752 and 753, of the Revised Statutes, and in its original form,
is manifestly inapplicable to the Neagle
case. But the decisions made, down to
1833, in cases where the supervising
authority of the United States Courts
was established, are the more valuable
as laying a broad foundation for the
power to coerce any State, or State official, which might interfere with the
actions of any officer of the United
States. Without seeking to exhaust the
decisions pro and con, the following
appear to sufficiently show all that was
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said before the supreme authority of
the United States Courts in National
questions was firmly established.
Chisholn v. Georgia (I793), 2 Dall.
419, was the early and great case where
one of the United States was held suable
by a citizen of another State. Of course
such a decision was too much alike for
State's Rights men and for State's Immunity men, and the Eleventh Amendment put an end to the collection of
debts due and justly owing by a State.
It is to be hoped that the time of public
honesty may be approaching when this
amendment will be so amended as to
read that, "The judicial power of the
United States shall extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against the United States, or any
one of them, by citizens of the United
States, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign State."
The Court was composed of IREDELL,
J., who dissented; BLAIR, J.,WILSON,

a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects."
Commenting on this section, IREDELL,
3. (dissenting), said: "The Constitution is particular in expressing the parties who may be the objects of the jurisdiction in any of these cases, but in
respect to the subject matter upon which
such jurisdiction is to be exercised, used
the word ' controversies' only. The
Act of Congress [the Judiciary Act of
1789, 13,J more particularly mentions
civil controversies, a qualification of the
general word in the Constitution, which,
I do not doubt, every reasonable man
will think well warranted, for it cannot
be presumed that the general word
' controversies' was intended to include
any proceedings that relate to criminal
cases, which, in all instances that respect the same government only, are
uniformly considered of a local nature,
and to be decided by its particular

J.,CUSHING,J.,and JAY, C.J., who all

The dissenting opinion proceeds:"The powers of the General Government, either of a Legislative or Executive nature, or which particularly concern Treaties with Foreign Powers, do,
for the most part (if not wholly), affect
individuals, and not States: they require
no aid from any State authority. This
is the great leading distinction between
the old Articles of Confederation and
the present Constitution. The judicial
power is ofapeculiar kind. It is, indeed,
commensurate with the ordinary Legislative and Executive powers of the
General Government, and the power
which concerns treaties. But it also
goes further. Where certain parties are
concerned, although the subject of the
controversy does not reiate to any of the
special objects of authority of the General Government, wherein the separate
sovereignties of the States are blended
in one common mass of supremacy, yet
the General Government has a judicial
authority in regard to such subjects of

agreed in the judgment of the Court.
The remarks of the judges on the subject of State sovereignty are worthy of
note, though the case was one of a
purely civil nature, being an action of
assumpsit.
The second section of the Third
Article of the Constitution provides:
"x. The judicial power shall extend to
all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies
to which the United States shall be a
party: to controversies between two or
more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens
of different States; between citizens of
the same State claiming lands under
grants of different States, and between
VOL XXXVII.-4o

laws:" Id. 431-2.
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controversy, and the Legislature of the
United States may pass all law.s necessary to give such judicial authority its
proper effect. So far as the States,
under the Constitution, can be made
legally liable to this authority, so far, to
be sure, they are subordinate to the authority of the United States, and their
individual sovereignty is, in this respect,
limited. But it is limited no farther
than the necessary execution of such
authority requires :" Id. 435, 436.
BLAIR, J. (one of the majority of the
Court), more instructively said: "If
sovereignty be an exemption from suit
in any other than the sovereign's own
Courts, it follows that, when a State, by
adopting the Constitution, has agreed to
be amenable to the judicial power of the
United States, she has, in that respect,
given up her right of sovereignty:" Id.
452.
WILSON, J. (another of the majority
of the Court), went further into general
and decisive principles: "This is a
case of uncommon magnitude. One of
the parties to it is a STATE; certainly
respectable, claiming to e sovereign.
The question to be determined is,
whether this State, so respectable, and
whose claim soars so high, is amenable
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States ? This question,
important in itself, will depend on
others more important still; and may,
perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one
no less radicalthan this--do the people
of the United States form a NATION?
* * * * As a judge of this Court,
I know and can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens of Georgia, when
they acted upon the large scale of the
Union, as a part of the ' People of the
United States,' did net surrender the
supreme, or sovereign power to that
State; but, as to the PurPoses of the
Union, retained it to themselves. As to
the putposes of the Union, therefore
Georgia is NOT a sovereign State. * * *

Whoever considers, in a combined and
comprehensive view, the generaltexture
of the Constitution, will be satisfied that
the people of the United States intended to form themselves into a Nation,for nationaltuitoses. They instituted, for such purposes, a National
Government, complete in all its parts,
with powers Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary; and, in all these powers, extending over the whole Nation. Is it
congruous that with regard to such purposes, any man, or body of men, any
person natural or artificial, should be
permitted to claim, successfully, entire
exemption from the jurisdiction of the
National Government? Would not such
claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very existence as a Nation ?" Id. 453, 457, 465.
These observations of Judge WVLSON
should be compared with those of McKEAN and the Virginia judges, as well
as of the Wisconsin Court, later on in
this annotation.
CUSHING, J. (another of the majority
of the Court), said: "As to corporations, all States whatever are corporations or bodies politic. The only question is, what are their powers? As to
individual States and the United Sates,
the Constitution marks the boundary of
powers. Whatever power is deposited
with the Union, by the people, for their
own necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of
States.

*

*

*

So that I think, no

argument of force can be taken from the
sovereignty of States. Where it has
been abridged, it was thought necessary
for the greater indispensable good of
the whole :" Id. 468.
JAY, C. J. (the last of the majority of
the Court), discussed the question of
State sovereignty on the same lines, and
summed up the opinions of the Court
in a few words: "Sovereignty is the
right to govern; a Nation, or Statesovereign, is the person or persons in whom
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that resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the
Prince; here it rests with the people;
there, the sovereign actually adiministers the government; here, never in a
single instance; our Governors are the
agents of the people, and at most stand
in the same relation to their sovereign,
in which regents in Eur,,e stand to
their sovereigns. Their Princes have
personalpowers, dignities and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but 'ffcia,;
nor do they partake in the sovereignty
otherwise, or in any other capacity,
than as private citizens:" It,472.
This is noteworthy, as the same sentiments are offered to-day as a palliative
to those who magnify State citizenship.
The same people, only different forms
of government for different purposes ;
this is the burden of the recent opinions mentioned in this annotation.
As to the general canon of construction, the Chief Jubtice proceeded to consider that, among the six objects embraced in the deign of the Constitution,
the second was, To establishjustice. "It
may be asked, what is the precise sense
and latitude in which the words to establishjustice, as here used, are to be
understood ? The answer to this question will result from the provisions made
in the Constitution on this head. They
are specified in the second section of
the Third Article, where is ordained,that
the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to ten descriptions of cases.
* * * This extension of power is
remedial, because it is to settle controversies. It is, therefore, to be construed
liberally. * * * When power is
thus extended to a controversy,it necessarily, as to all judicial purposes, is also
extended to those between whom it
subsists :" Ad. 476.

Comm. v. Cobbett (1798), 3 Dall.
(Pa.) 467, was a case where the State
Court refused to allow the removal to
the United States Circuit Court, by an

alien, of a suit against him. The ground
taken by the Pennsylvania Court was
that the Supreme Court of the United
States had the sole jurisdiction over
civil suits to which a State was a party,
and that this was a criminal suit, and
not a civil suit. The remarks of Chief
Justice AICKEAN, which were afterwards quoted by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals (inf-a, page 629),
would undoubtedly be characterized, at
this day, as dicta, as he said, " Previous to the delivery of my opinion in a
cause of such importance as to the consequences of the decision, I will make
a few preliminary observations on the
Constitution and laws of the United
States of America :" Id. 473. As a
part of the "preliminary observations,"
so heartily approved by the Virginia
Judge, the following words were used:
" The Government of the United States
forms a part of the government of each
State; its jurisdiction extends to the
providing for the common defence
against exterior injuries and violence,
the regulation of commerce and other
matters specially numerated in the Constitution; all other powers remain in
the individual States, comprehending
the interior and other concerns; these
combined form one complete government. Should there be any defect in
this form of government, or any collision occur, it cannot be remedied by
the sole act of the Congress, or of a
State; the people must be resorted to,
for enlargement or modification. If a
State should differ with the United
States about the construction of them,
there is no common umpire but the
people, who should adjust the affair by
making amendments in the constitutional way, or suffer from the defect.
In such a case, the Constitution of the
United States is federal; it is a league
or treaty, made by the individual States,
as one party, and all. the States, as
another party. * * * There is no
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provision in the Constitution, that in
such case, the judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States shall control
and be conclusive; neither can the
Congress, by a law, confer that power :"
Id. 473, 474.
The United States v. Hudson &"
Goodwin (1812), 7 Cranch (II U. S.)
32, was a case certified from a Circuit
Court of the United States, upon a division of opinion, whether the Circuit
Court had common law jurisdiciion in
cases of libel. The Supreme Court,
composed of MARSHALL, C. J.,.
and
WASHINGTON (absent), JOHNSON, LivINGsTON, TODD, DUVALL and STORY,
J.J., held that all exercise of criminal
jurisdiction in common law cases was
not within the implied powers of the
courts of the United States: Id. 34The opinion of the majority of the
Court was delivered by JoNsoN, J.,
who said: "The powers of the General Government are made up of concessions from the several States; whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The
judicial power of the United States is a
constituent part of these concessions;
that power is to be exercised by courts
organized for the purpose, and brought
into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the
Courts which the United States may,
under their general powers, constitute,
one only--the Supreme Court-possesses jurisdiction derived immediately
from the Constitution, and of which the
legislative power cannot deprive it:"
Id. 33.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (x816), I
Wheat. (4 U.S.) 304, was a writ of
error from the Court of Appeals of Virgini, founded upon the refusal of a
State Court, for the first time (Id. 342),
to obey the mandate of the Supreme
Court of the United States, granted in
i 813, in the same case (sub nom. Fairfax's Dezisee v. Hunters Lessee, 7
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Cranch (ix U. S.) 6o3), where the
State Court had denied a right under
the treaty of 1794, with Great Britain.
The jurisdiction of the United States
Court thus became the point in issue.
The Virginia Court had answered the
mandate of the Supreme Court of the
United States, by entry of judgment,
"that the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States does
not extend to this Court * * * [and]
that the proceedings [on the previous
writ of error], in the Supreme Court,
were coram nonjudice, in relation to
this Court:" a proposition not denied
by the Supreme Court, if the premises
had been sound: Elliott v. PLrot
(1828), I Peters (26 U. S.) 328, 340.
Speaking of the third article of the
Constitution which creates and defines
the judicial power of the United States,
SToY, J.,said: "It is a part of the
very same instrument which was to act,
not merely upon individuals, but upon
States; and to deprive them altogether
of the exercise of some powers of sovereignty, and to restrain and regulate
them in the exercise of others :" Id.
328.
This language is important, for JOHNSON, J.,in a separate opinion, said: "It
will be observed in this case, that the
Court disavows all intention to decide
on the right to issue compulsory process to the State Courts." He then
goes on to use the words quoted above
(page 6ox), in immediate connection
with his alarm over the asserted power
of every State Court to decide whether
the United States Supreme Court had
exceeded its powers. The unanimous
opinion of the Court was against any
such power. The Court was again
composed of MA,SHAlx, C. J.,
WASHINGTON, JOHNSON, LIVINGSTON,TODD,
DuvA and STORY, J.J.
A curious feature of the dicta contained in this concurring opinion will
be apparent from a quotation: "Sup-
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pose a foreign minister, or an officer
acting regularly under authority from
the United States, seized today, tried
to-morrow, and hurried the next day to
execution. Such cases may occur, and
have occurred in other countries. The
angry, vindictive passions of men have
too often made their way into judicial
tribunals, and we cannot hope forever
to escape their baleful influence. In
the case supposed, there ought to be a
power somewhere, to restrain, or punish,
or the Union must be dissolved. At
present, the uncontrollable exercise of
criminal jurisdiction is most securely
confided to the State tribunals. The
courts of the United States are vested
with no power to scrutinize into the proceedings of the State courts in criminal
cases; * * * and extreme, indeed, I
flatter myself, must be the case in which
the General Government could ever be
induced to assert this right. If ever
such a case should occur, it will be time
enough to decide upon their constitutional power to do so :" Id. 377.
The case in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia is reported in 4
Mulf. i (April, IxS4 ), and the judges
gave separate opinions. CABELL, J.,
said: "The Constitution of the'United
States contemplates the independence
of both governments, and regards the
residuary sovereignty of the States as
not less inviolable than the delegated
soyereignty of the United States. It
must have been foreseen that controversies would sometimes arise as to the
boundaries of the two jurisdictions. Yet
the Constitution has provided no umpire,
has erected no tribunal, by which they
shallbe settled :" Id. 9. Again, "what
that Constitution is, what those laws and
treaties are, must, in cases coming before
the State courts, be decided by the State
judges, according to their own judgments, and upon their own responsibility. To the opinions of the Federal
Courts they may always pay the respect

which is due to the opinions of other
learned and upright judges; * * * but
it is respect only, and not the acknowledgment of conclusive authority:" Td.
ii. That is," the powers veted by the
Constitution, in the Congress of the
United States, were delegated for purposes essential to the general welfare,
and ought not to be defeated or impaired; and I have no doubt that one
of these powers is that of making all
laws, necessary and proper, for extending the judicial power of the United
States, to all the cases, to which the
Constitution declares that that power
shall extend. I must not, however, be
understood as impeaching the concurrent jurisdiction, originaland Jizal,of
the State courts, prov'ided the parties
shall elect their jurisiliction:" Id. 15.
BROOKE, J., said:
"The oath to
support the constitution, with a strong
responsibility to those from whom all
power is derived, seem to be the only
sanctions against the exercise of power
not given by the people. That oath,
which is prescribed by the sixth article,
imposes no subordination upon those to
whom it is administered: it is common
to all who exercise power under either
[State or Federal] government:" I.
24.
ROANE, J., also based his concurring

opinion upon the case in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania: Comm. v. Cobbett (1798), 3 Dall. (Pa.) 467, sUP-a.
The Judge said: "One of the appellee's counsel was pleased to call this
-decision a dictum of Chief Justice McKEAN'S. I must be excused for saying
it is no dictum, nor is it the sole and
undivided opinion of that respected
judge. It is the solemn and unanimous
decision and resolution of the Supreme
Court of one of the most respecied States
in the Union. * * * * I consider this
deciion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. as a complete and solemn authority, to show, that in case of a differ-
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ence of opinion between the two governments [State and Federal], as to the
extent of the powers vested by the Constitution, while neither party is competent to bind the other, the courts of each
have power to act upon the subject:"
Id. 53The eflect of uniformity of decision,
by the United States Judges, was also
felt from the beginning, and the earliest
contrary thought was this: "The counsel for the appellee have furnished us
with a string of cases in which the jurisdiction in question has been entertained
by the Supreme Court of the United
States. They have had it in their power
to do this, because the cases occurred
in that court, and not in this; because
the man, and not the lion, was the
painter (See X-sop's Fables):" ROANE,
J., Hunter v. Afartin (1814), 4 Munf.
(Va.) 51.
After such sentiments, the clear and
decisive language of Chief Justice
TANEY, in Abelman v. Booth (1858),
21 How. (62 U. S.) 5o6, 522, ought to
be carefully read and reflected upon, as
the sentiment of one well nigh devoid
of political principles inimical to State
sovereignty; especially if MARSHALL
and SToRY should be thought too strong
in their Nationalism.
Cohens v. Virginia (1821), 6 Wheat.
(19 U. S.) 264, came next. It was "a
writ of error to the judgment of the
Court of Hustings for the borough of
Norfolk. on an information for selling
lottery tickets, contrary to an Act of the
Legiha.ure of Virginia." An Act of
Congress, authorizing the lottery, was
held invalid in Virginia, and an appeal
to a higher State Court denied; this
writ was then taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. On
a moion made in the latter Court to
dismiss the writ, three points were arguedFirst. That the State was a defendant.

Second. That no writ of error to the
State Court could be prosecuted.
Third. That neither the Constitution
nor the laws of the United States had
been violated. This point was finally
sustained by the Court after a hearing
on the merits, and does not fall within
the scope of the present annotation.
MARSHALL, C. J., said--" The questions presentid to the Court by the two
first points made at the bar, are of great
magnitude, and may truly be said vitally to affect the Union. They exclude
the inquiry whether the Constitution
and laws of the United States have
been violated by the judgment which
the plaintiffs in error seek to review;
and maintain that, admitting such violation, it is not in the power of the Government to apply a corrective. They
maintain that the Nation does not possess a department capable of restraining peaceably, and by authority of law,
any attempts which may be made, by a
part, against the legitimate powers of
the whole; and that the Government is
reduced to the alternative of submitting
to such attempts, or of resisting them
by force. They maintain that the Constitution of the United States has provided no tribunal for the final construction of itself, or of the laws or treaties
of the Nation ; but that this power may
be exercised, in the last resort, by the
courts of every State of the Union. That
the Constitution. laws, and treaties, may
receive as many constructions as there
are States; and that this is not a mischief, or, if a mischief, is irremediable.
These abstract propositions are to be
determined; for he who demands decision, without permitting inquiry, affirms that the decision he asks does not
depend on inquiry :" Id. 377. And
these are seen to be the sentiments of
the Virginia Judges, page 629, upra.
Discussing, then, the first question,
the Chief Justice proceeded-" A case
in law or equity, consists of the right of
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one party, as well as of the other, and
may truly be said to arise under the
Constitution, or a law of the United
States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either. * *
With the ample powers confided to this
Supreme Government, for these interesting purposes, are connected many
express and important limitations on the
sovereignty of the States, which are
made for the same purposes. The
powers of the Union, on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce, and
on many others, are, in themselves, limitations of the sovereignty of the States;
but, in addition to these, the sovereignty
of the States is surrendered in many
instances where the surrender can only
operate to the benefit of the people,
and where, perhaps, no other power is
conferred on Congress than a conservative power, to maintain the principles
established in the Constitution. The
maintenance of these principles in their
purity, is certainly among the great duties of Government. One of the instruments by which this duty may be
peaceably performed, is the judicial department. It is authorized to decide all
cases of every description, arising under
the Constitution, or laws, of the United
States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of those
cases in which a State may be a party.
* * * We think a case arising under
the Constitution, or laws, of the United
States, is cognizable in the courts.of the
Union, whoever may be the parties to
that case :" Id. 379, 382-3.
It should be observed that this was
twenty-four years after the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment, which was
declared adopted January 8th, 1798.
The Chief Justice proceeded, substantially, to review the sentiments of
the Virginia Judges, quoted above, and
put them aside with these words-" But
a Constitution is framed for ages to
come, and is designed to approach im-

mortality, as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed
to storms and tempests, and its framers
must be unwise statesmen indeed, if
they have not provided it, so far as its
nature will permit, with the means of
self-preservation from the perils it may
be destined to encounter. No Government ought to be so defective in its organization as not to contain within itself the means of securing the execution of its own laws against other dangers than those which occur every day.
Courts of justice are the means most
usually employed, and it is reasonable
to expect that a Government should repose on its own Courts, rather than on
others. There is certainly nothing in
the circumstances under which our
Constitution was formed, nothing in
the history of the times, which would
justify the opinion that the confidence
reposed in the States was so implicit as
to leave them, and their tribunas, the
power of resisting, or defeating, in the
form of law, the legitimate measures of
the Union. The requisitions of Congress, under the Confederation, were as
constitutionally obligatory as the laws
enacted by the present Congress. That
they were habitually disregarded, is a
fact of universal notoriety. * *
The
people made the Constitution, and the
people can unmake it. It is the creature of their own will, and lives only
by their will. But this supreme and
irresistible power to make, or to unmake, resides only in the whole body
of the people, not in any sub-division
of them. The attempt of any of the
parts to exercise it, is usurpation, and
ougt to be repelled by those to whom
the people have delegated their power
of repelling it:" 1d.387-8, 389.
These last words are the foundation
for the Force Bill of 1833, izfra.
Coming closer to the Neagle case,
the Chief Justice noticed the argument
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that "cases between a State and one
of its own citizens, do not come within
the general scope of the Constitution :"
Id. 39o. And this was the answer to
that argument-" If jurisdiction depended entirely on the character of the
parties, and was not given where the
parties have not an original right to
come into Court, that part of the -second section of theThird Article, which
extends the judicial power to all cases
arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, would be mere
surplusage. It is to give jurisdiction,
where the character of the parties would
not give it, that this very important
part of the clause was inserted:" Id.
39'.
Another definition of a case, which
falls with the supervising powers of tht
Supreme Court, is given at the close of
that portion of the opinion which treats
of the power which is appellate, and
not original, though a State is a party,
as in a criminal case. "The article
does not extend the judicial power to
every violation of the Constitution
which may possibly take place, but ' to
a case in law or equity,' in which a
right, under such law, is asserted in a
court of justice: If the question cannot be brought into a Court, then there
is no case in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the words of the
article. But if, in any controversy depending in a Court, the cause should
depend on the validity of such a law,
that would be a case arising under the
Constitution, to which the judicial power
of the United States would extend :"
Id. 405.
Coming next to the question, whether
the Eleventh Amendment prevents the
examination of a conviction in the State
Criminal Court, the amendment was first
cited literallyXI. "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity,
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commenced, or prosecuted, against one
of the United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign State."
Then, after a discussion of the nature
of a suit and a writ of error, the conclusion reached was-" If this writ of error
be a suit in the sense of the Eleventh
Amendment, it is not asuit commenced
or prosecuted ' by a citizen of another
State, or by a citizen or subject of any
foreign State.' It is not, then, within
the amendment, but is governed entirely
by the Constitution as originally framed,
and we have aheady seen, that in its
origin, the judicial power was extended
to all cases arising under the Constitution, or laws, of the United States, without respect to parties :" Id. 412. Just
before, the Chief Justice had expressed
his opinion that " If a suit, brought in
one Court, and carried by legal process
to a supervising court, be a continuation
of the same suit, then this suit is not
commenced, or prosecuted, against a
State. It is clearly, in its commencement, the suit of a State against an individual, which suit is transferred to this
Court, not for the purpose of asserting
any claim against the State, but for the
purpose of asserting a Constitutional
defense against a claim, made by a
State :" Id. 409.
The decision then passed to the affirmation of the judgment in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee (supra, page 628), and
after reviewing the objections advanced
by the Virginia judges, and also considering the nature of the Union, and
citing, as contemporary exposition, The
Federalist, and the Judiciary Act of
1789, the Chief Justice reached this
conclusion--" Dismissing the unpleasant suggestion, that any motives which
may not be fairly avowed, or which
ought not to exist can ever influence a
State or its courts, the necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the Constitution and laws of

MATTER OF DAVID NEAGLE.

the United States, would itself suggest
the propriety of vesting in some single
tribunal the power of deciding, in the
last resort, all cases in which t.ey are
involved. We are not restrained, then,
by the political relations between the
General and State Governments, from
construing the words of the Constitution, defining the judicial power, in their
true sense. We are not bound to construe them more restrictively than they
naturally import. * * * The American people may certainly give to a national tribunal a supervising power over
those judgments of the State courts,
which may conflict with the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United
States, without converting them into
Federal courts, or converting the National into a State tribunal. The one
Court still derives its authority from the
State, the other still derives its authority
from the Natio,. . * * ' A complete
consolidation of the States, so far as
respects the judicialpower,' would authorize the Legislature to confer on the
Federal courts appellate jurisdiction
from the State courts, in all cases whatsoever. The distinction between such
a power, and that of giving appellate
jurisdiction in a few specified cases, in
the decision of which the Nation takes
an interest, is too obvious not to be per:
ceived by all. * *
The question,
then, must depend on the words themselves; and on their construction, we
shall be the more readily excused for
not adding to the observations already
made, because the subject was fully discussed and exhausted in the case of
Mfartin v. Hunter:" Id. 416, 422, 423.
This decision, in Cohens v. Virginia,
was unanimous, the Court being composed of MARSHALL, C. J., and JOHNSON, LIVINGSTON, TODD, DUVALL, and
STORY, J. J. WASHINGTON, J., was
absent.
The power of the United States courts
and judges to declare and enforce a final

determination of the meaning and application of the National laws, being thus
settled, we may now pass to the question of the power to release officers and
persons in the custody of the State authorities.
The general question of the right to
issue writs of ha'eas corpus was discussed in such cases as CUS. v. iammilton, (1795), 3 DalI. (3 U. S.) 17; Ex
Parte Bollnan (I807), 4 Cranch (S U.
S.) 75; Ex parte [Valkins (1830), 3
Pet. (28 U. S.) 193; Exparte Ahillgan

(IS66), 4 Wall. (7I U. S.) 2. But this
annotation is necessarily confined to
cases where the National powers have
been exertcd over personi detained by
the States, and the gcneral principles
must be assumed, or merely alluded to
in connection with the precise subject.
As the courts of the United States are
of limited jurisdiction and also dependent upon Acts of Congress for the right
to exercise the judicial powers conferred
by the Constitution of the United States
( U. S. v. Hudson (IS12), 7 Cranch (Ixi
U. S.)32; Ex pai-te B'ollman, supra;
Tennessee v. Davis, imra), the statutes
from the time of the celebrated Force
Bill of 1833 will be cited in full, in their
proper order of time. But, first, it will
be well to examine one more case.
In Osborn v. The Bank (I824), 9
Wheat. (22 U. S.) 739, the jurisdittion
of the United States Circuit Court, in
suits by the Bank, was upheld, because
given by a valid law of the United
States, MARSHALL, C. J., saying: "The
Constitution establishes the Supreme
Court, and defines its jurisdiction. It
enumerates cases in which its jurisdiction is original and exclusive; and then
defines that which is -appellate, but does
not insinuate that in any such ca-,e, the
power cannot be exercised in its original
form by courts of original jurisdiction.
It is not insinuated that the judicial
power, in cases depending on the character of the cause, cannot be exercised
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in the first instance, in the courts of the
Union, but must first be exercised in the
tribunals of the State; tribunals over
which the Government of the Union has
no adequate control, and which may be
closed to any claim asserted under a law
of the United States. We perceive, then,
no ground on which the proposition can
be maintained, that Congress is incapable of giving the Circuit Courts original
jurisdiction, in any case to which the
appellate jurisdiction extends. We ask,
then, if it can be sufficient to exclude
this jurisdiction, that the case involves
questions depending on general principles? A cause may depend on several
questions of fact and law. Some of
these may depend on the construction
of a law of the United States; others on
principles unconnected with that law.
If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title, or right, set up by
the party, may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution, or law, of
the United States, and sustained by the
opposite construction, provided the facts
necessary to support the action be made
out,then all the other questions must be
decided as incidental to this, which
gives that jurisdiction. Those other
questions cannot arrest the proceedings.
Under this construction the judicial
power of the Union extends effectively
and beneficially to that most important
class of cases, which depend on the
character of the cause. On the opposite
construction, the judicial power never
can be extended to a whole case, as
expressed by the Constitution, but to
those parts of cases only which present
the particular question involving the
construction of the Constitution, or the
law. We say it never can be extended
to the whole case, because, if the circumstance that other points are involved
in it, shall disable Congress from authorizing the courts of the Union to take
jurisdiction of the original cause, it
equally disables Congress from author-

izing those courts to take jurisdiction of
the whole cause, on an appeal, and thus
will be restricted to a single question in
that cause; and words obviously intended to secure to those who claim
rights under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United. States, a trial in
the Federal courts will be restricted to
the insecure remedy of an appeal upon
an insulated point, after it has received
that shape which may be given to it by
another tribunal, into which he is forced
against his will. We think, then, that
when a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the
Constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact, or of law, may be involved
in it:" Id. 821-3.
All the other Judges, except JOHNSON,
J. (who dissented), agreed with the
ChiefJustice. They were WASHiNGrTON,
TODD, DuvAL,
SON,

STORY, and THoup-

J.J.

JOHNSON, J., in the course of dissenting opinion, said: "Efforts have been
made to fix the precise sense of the
Constitution, when it vests jurisdiction
in the General Government, in 'cases
arising under the laws of the United
States.' To me the question appears
susceptible of a very simple solution;
that all depends upon the identity of the
case supposed; according to which
idea, a case may be such in its very
existence, or it may become such in its
progress. An action may ' live, move,
and have its being,' in a law of the
United States; such is that given for
the violation of a patent right, * * *
And of the other description [those], *
* * in which the pleadings, or evidence,
raised the question on the law, or Constitution, of the United States. In this
class of cases, the occurrence of a question makes the case and transfers it, as
provided for under the twenty-fifth see-
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tion of the Judiciary Act, to the jurisdiction of the United States. 4, * * As
to cases of the first description, cx ncessitae rei, the courts of the United States
must be susceptible of or:ginal juri diclion; and, as to all other cases, I should
hold them, also, susceptible of original
jurisdiction, if it were practicable, in the
nature of things, to make out the definition of the case, so as to bring it under
the Constitution, judicially, upon an
original suit. But, until the plaintiff can
control the defendant in his pleadings,
I see no practical mode of determining
when the case does occur, otherwise
than by permitting the cause to advance
until the case, for which the Constitution
provides, shall actually arise:" Id.
SS7- 9 .
The Force Bill of March 2, 1833 (4
Stat. at L. 632), is entitled "An Act
further to provide for the collection of
duties on imports," and enacts, . 7That either of the Justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District
Court of the United States, in addition
to the authority already conferred by
law [ x4 of the Judiciary Act, supra,
page 624], shall have power to grant
writs of hiabeas corpus in all cases of a
prisoner, or prisoners, in jail, or confinement, when he, or they, shall be committed, or confined on, or by, any authority, or law, for any act done, or
omitted to be done, in pursuance of a
law of the United States, or any order,
process, or decree, of any judge or court
thereof, anything in any Act of Congress
to the contrary notwithstanding. And
if any person, or persons, to whom such
writ of habeas corpus may be directed,

shall refuse to obey the same, or shall
neglect, or refuse, to make return, or
shall make a false return thereto, in
addition to the remedies already given
by law, he, or they, shall be deemed
and taken to be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall, on conviction before any court
of competent jurisdiction, be punished

by fine not exceeding one thou-and dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding
six months, or by either, according to
the nature and aggravation of the case.
This section is incorporated into sections 753 and 643, of the Revised Statutes; no cases grew out of it at the
time (see i Von Ilolst, Const. Ilist. 459.
sqq.), and it remained for use in protecting United States -Marshals in fugitive slave cases, as mentioned below.
The importatnce of the peculiar wording of this section will be further apparent when there ii considered the
refusal of the Circuit Court for Pennsylvania and New Jersey, to release the
Secretary of the Spanish I.egation, by a
writ of haeas,m',,tps, from conl.nement

bythe State authorities, for forg.ry: r.r
prte L'baera (1S05), I Wah.q, C. C.
\VAs.tln;ON, J, said, while
232.
speaking of the Fourteenth Section of
the Judiciary Act: "I am one of those,
I confess, who have alwa% thought it
would have been better if the I egslalure of the Union, in allotting to the
several courts the jurisdiction they were
to exercise, had occupied the whole
ground marked out by the Constitution;
but I am not one of tlo-e who think it
a commendable quality in a Judge to
enlarge, by construction, the sphere of
his jurisdiction: that of the Federal
Courts is of a limited nature, and cannot be extended beyond the grant:"
I. 237. And the Secretary was left to
the mercies of the State and his action
or criminal remedy, as he might be advised.
The Act of August 29, 1842 (5 Stat.
at L. 539), came next, and, though not
closely connected with the Neagle case,
is worthy of note, for its distinct advance
at so late a day. Its immediate cause,
however, was the Treaty of 1842 with
Great Britain.
It is ent,.. "An Act to provide further remedial justice in the courts of the
United States;" and enacts-" That
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either of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States, or Judge of
any District Court of the United States,
in which a prisoner is confined, in addition to the authority already conferred
by law [ 14°f the Judiciary Act], shall
have power to grant writs of habeas
cortur in all cases of any prisoner, or
prisoners, in jail or confinement, where
he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled
therein, shall be committed, 6r confined,
or in custody, under or by any authority
or law, or process founded thereon, of
the United States, or of any one of them,
for or on account of any act done, or
omitted, under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up, or claimed, under the
commission, or order, or sanction, of any
foreign State, or sovereignty, the validity
and effect whereof depend upon the law
of nations, or under color thereof. And
upon the return of the said writ, and
due proof of the service of notice of the
said proceeding, to the Attorney-General, or other officer, prosecuting the
pleas of the State, under whose authority
the prisoner has been arrested, committed, or is held in custody, to be prescribed by the said Justice, or Judge, at
the time of granting said writ, the said
Justice, or Judge, shall proceed to hear
the said cause ; and if, upon hearing the
same, it shall appear that the prisoner,
or prisoners, is, or are, entitled to be
discharged from such confinement, commitment, custody, or arrest, for, or by
reason of, such alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, so set up and claimed, and the
laws of nations applicable thereto, and
that the same exists in fact, and has
been duly proved to the said Justice, or
Judge, then it shall be the duty of the
said Justice, or Judge, forthwith to discharge such prisoner, or prisoners, accordingly. And if it shall appear to
the said Justice, or Judge, that such

judgment, or discharge, ought not to be
rendered, then the said prisoner, or
prisoners, shall be forthwith remanded:
Providedalways, that from any decision
of such Justice, or Judge, an appeal may
be taken to the Circuit Court of the
United States, for the District in which
the said cause is heard; and from the
judgment of the said Circuit Court, to
the Supreme Court of the United States,
on such terms, and under such regulations and orders, as well as for the custody and appearance of the prisoner, or
prisoners, as for sending up to the appellate tribunal a transcript of the petition, writ of habeas corpes returned
thereto, and other proceedings, as the
Judge hearing the said cause may prescribe;. and pending such proceedings,
or appeal, and until final judgment be
rendered therein, and after final judgment of discharge in the same, any proceeding against the said prisoner, or
prisoners, in any State Court, or by, or
under the authority of any State, for any
matter, or thing, so heard and determined, or in process of being heard and
determined, under and by virtue of such
writ of habeas corpus, shall be deemed
null and void.
This statute is incorporated in,sections 751, 752, 753, 762, 763, 764, 765
and 766 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States.
Ex tare Darr(1845), 3 How. (44
U.S.) io4, was a motion by the counsel
for Dorr, for a writ of habeas corrus.
McLEAN, J., stated the case thus:
"Thomas W. Dorr was convicted, before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
at March Term, 1844, of treason against
the State of Rhode Island, and sentenced to the State prison for life. And
it appears from the affidavits of Francis
C. Treadwell, a counsellor-at-law of this
Court, and others, that access to Dorr
in his confinement, to ascertain whether
he desires a writ of error, to remove the
record of his conviction to this Court,
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has been refused. On this ground the
C. J.,and STORY, McLEAN, WAYNE,
above application has been made. Have
CATRON, McKINLEY, DANIEL and
the Court power to issue a writ of
NELSON, j.J.
TRE.AT, J. (11, re AMcDonald (1861),
habeas corpus in this case? * * In the
trial cf Dorr it was insited that the law 9 AMEr. L.w REG., (0. S.) 661, 672),
of the State, under which he was pro.,e-while sitting in the Diktrict Court for
the District of Missouri, explains why
cuted, was repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States. And on this
.Do,-r's case was so decided: "That
proviso [to the Fourteenth Section of the
ground a writ of error is desired, under
the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Judiciary Act] was for the express purAct above named. That, as the prayer
pose of preventing conflicts between
Federal and State authority-of confinof this writ can only be made by Dorr,
or by some one under his authority, and
ing the United States Courts and Judges
as acce-s to him in prison is denied, it
within their appropriate spheres."
is insisted that the writ to bring him beExparleJenkins(1853), U. S. Circ.
fore the Court is the only means though
Ct., E. Dist. Pa., 2 Wall., Jr. 521 : S. C.
which this Court can exercise jurisdic2 AMER. LAw REG. (0. S.), 144. The
tion in his case by a writof error. Even
first case was a habeas eopus issued to
if this were admitted, yet the question bring up the bodies of certain United
recurs whether this Court has power to
States Deputy Marshals who had been
issue the writ to bring him before it.
arrested under a charge of assault and
That it has no such power under the
battery, while seeking to arrest a fugitive
common law is clear, and it is equally slave in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.
clear that the power nowhere exists,
(A full statement of the facts of this
unless it be found in the fourteenth secand the following cases, is given in
tion above cited. [Supra, page 624.]
3 AMER. LAW REG. (0. S.), 2o8 sqq)
* * The words of the proviso are unThe State of Pennsylvania did not make
ambiguous. They admit of but one
any appearance or opposition on the
construction. And that they qualify and
return of the writ, and the Court refused
restrict the preceding provisions of the to hear David Paul Brown, Esq., who
section, is indisputable. [So held by nominally appeared for the constable,
MARSHALL, C. J.,
E.r parte Bollnan but in reality for certain abolitionist
(1807), 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 75, 99.]
societies. Mr. Brown had been heard,
Neither this, nor any other Court of the
as Amicus Curia,, on the presentation
United States, or Judge thereof, can of the petition for the writ, and pointed
issue a habeas corpus, to bring up a
out that the Habeas Corpus section of
prisoner, who is in custody, under a the Judiciary Act of 17S 9 (0 14) did not
sentence, or execution, of a State Court,
authorize the issuing of the writ in this
for any other purpose than -o be used
case. GRIFR, J.,
said: " But this writ
as a witness. And it is immaterial
was not allowed and issued under the
whether the imprisonment be under
general law, but, as the District Attorney
cihil or criminal process. As the law of the United States has stated, under
now stands, an individual, who may be
special powers conferred by the Act of
indicted in a Circuit Court for treason
Congress of 2d March, I8r3. * * ** *
against the United States, is beyond the This Act was passed when (Ch. 57,
power of Federal Courts and Judges, if
7) a certain State of this Union
he be in custody under the authority of
[South Carolina] had threatened to
a State:" .d. io4, io5. The Court was nullify Acts of Congress, and to treat
unanimous, being composed of TANEY,
those as criminals who should attempt
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to execute them; and it was intended
as a remedy against such State legislation. * * * The extreme advocate of
State rights would scarcely contend that,
in such caies, the Courts of the United
States should be wholly unable to protect themselves or their officers :" Id.
527,529. A discharge was ordered.
ExparteJenkins(vide supra): The
second case was a habeas corpus to
bring up the bodies of the same Deputy
Marshals, who had been arrested on a
capias for the same assault, at the suit
of the fugitive slave, and committed for
want of bail. KANE, J., said: "He
who has read the Act of Congress of
March 2d, 1833, or who remembers the
times, to meet which it was passed,
knows perfectly well that it looked to
the contingency of a collision between
the general and the State authorities.
There were statesman then who imagined it possible that a statute of the
United States might be so obnoxious in
a particular region, or to a particular
State, as that the local functionaries
would refuse to obey it, and would interfere with the officers who were
charged to give it force, even by arresting and imprisoning them. In direct
antecedence, therefore, to the section
under consideration, they framed two
other [temporary] sections of the same
statute, one authorizing the military
forces of the United States to be employed in aid of the judicial power; the
other authorizing a resort to special jails
for the safe-keeping of United States
prisoners. It was necessary to go one
step further. The military power might
enforce the execution of the laws, when
the Marshal had failed and been made
a prisoner himself for attempting to
execute them; the prisons specially
constituted might detain those whom
the military had arrested; but the officer
of the law, arrested in the discharge of
his duty, imprisoned for the offence of
attempting to discharge it, perhaps at

the suit of the resisting State, more
probably at the instance of.some private
grief, what was to become of him?
This seventh section meets the case and
gives the remedy:" Id. 535. A discharge was ordered. (s. C. 3 AMER.
LAv REGISTER (0.

S.), 227.)

Ex~parteJenkins(vide supra) : The
third case was a habeas corpus to bring
up the bodies of the same Deputy Marshals, who had been arrested under a
bench warrant from the Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County, based
on an indictment charging them with
riot, assault and battery, and assault
with attempt to kill. The circumstances of all three cases were the same.
KANE, J., again discharged the Marshals, saying: " * * * The rule which
has been referred to, as obtaining so
generally in the cases of concurrent jurisdiction, that the Court which first
asserts jurisdiction, shall retain it to the
end, does not apply. That is a rule of
comity, founded on the general convenience, seeking to avert a conflict cf action between two sets of courts. It
assumes that the jurisdictions are concurrent, and the controversies the same.
But in cases like that before me, either
the subjects of controversy in the two
courts are not the same, but the proceedings involve differing questions of
law or fact; or invoke different modes
of relief or censure; or else, all these
being the same in the two courts, it was
the object and purpose of the Act of
Congress to make the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court revisory, and its action
controlling, for the very reason that,
otherwise, such a conflict might exist
between the two. On the first of these
suppositions, there has been no prior
assertion of jurisdiction by the tribunal
of the State; on the other, the relation
of the Federal to the State Courts is
adversary rather than concurrent. Ina
word, then, as I read the section, it is
my duty to hear and determine, not-
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withstanding the proceedings that have
been had before a State Court, just so
far as may bear upon the question of the
relator's right to a discharge under the
laws of the United States. But no
further:" Id. 542.
U. S. ex redv. Aforris (1854), 2 Am.

LAW REG. (0. S.) 348, in the District
Court for Wisconsin, was very similar
to the preceding cases, and the Deputy
Marshal was discharged.
Thomas v.

Crossin (1854), 3 A..

LAW REG. (0. S.) 207, is the hearing,
in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
of a motion for an attachment against the
Sherifffor failure to bring in the bodies of
the Deputy Marshals, discharged by the
United States Court, as mentioned above,
page 638. After reviewing the nullification proceedings of South Carolina, the
seventh section of the Force Bill was
construed only to relate to acts done in
pursuance of "an avowed J2urPose, by
some authority or law of a State, to disregard an act of Congress, and to imprison, or otherwise punish, the officers
of the United States, and their assistants,
for enforcing it, and operates only in
cases where this purpose appears on the
face of theproeedings:

A1. 216. The

italics are those of Judge Lewis, and
some additional extracts from his opinion
are necessary for the understanding of
such a narrow construction of this perpetual section of the Force Bill. The
learned Judge alluded to the provisions
of the Act of 1842 (strta) and then
said: "But no such provisions are contained in the Act of 1833. No authority
is given to ' hear the cause,' nor to receive proofs, apart from the cause of
detainer returned. The difference between the two acts, and the diversity in
the several occasions which produced
them, plainly show that Congress intended that the powers granted by, and
the mode of action under them, should
also be diflerent. In the one case, the
Judges were confined to the cause of

detainer returned, for the reason that
this was all that was required to accomplish the object of the act. In the other,
they were authorized to- go behind the
return, and to inquire into the facts and
merits of the justification relied on; for
nothing short of this would effectuate
the manifest intention of the law, or
meet the mischief designed to be remedied:" d. 217-8.
Without anticipating too much, the
language of TRF.R.T, J. (In re.1fDonald
(1861), 9 AMER. L.AW REG. (0. S.) 662),
while sitting in the District Court for
Missouri, may be quoted : "Suffice it
to say, that in each instance when the
Federal Courts have been compelled to
act under the law of 1833, so far as is
known, they have not failed to exercise

and enforce their authority, in cases
similar to those just mentioned. Judge
McLEA- and Judge GRIER, of the Supreme Court, have given elaborate, convincing and sound decisions upon that
subject; the correctness of which,
Judges LEVTT, KANE and MILLER,

of the District Courts, have not hesitated
to put into practical application, despite
local excitement, prejudices and resistance :" Id. 684.
Ex p arte Robinson (1855), 6 Mc-

Lean 355, was a petition for a frabeas
Caorpus, by the United States Marshal
for the District of Ohio, stating his
imprisonment by a State Judge for the
performance of his duty in connection
with the Fugitive Slave Law. McLEAN
(Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States) released
the Marshal, of course, and as the State
Judge had relied upon the reasoning of
the Wisconsin cases (3 Wis. I and 157),
decided in 1854 and reversed by the
United States Supreme Court in 1858:
o

(infrap. 64 ) the learned judge wenton

to say:--" It is a general principle of
law, to which I know of no exception,
that the laws of every Government
shall be construed by itself; and such
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construction is acted upon by the judiciary of all other countries. By the
Federal Constitution [Art. IIl. Sec. 1]
the judicial power of the United States
is declared to be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." Under this provision,
the judiciary of the Union gives a construction to the laws, which is obligatory on the State tribunals * * * *
State rights are invoked by the counsel.
If these rights are construed to mean a
subversion of the Federal authorities,
they maybe somewhat in danger. * *
A sense of duty compels me to say,
that the proceedings of the honorable
Judge were not only without the authority of law, but against law, and that the
proceedings are void, and I an bound
to treat them as a nullity." Id. 362,
364-5.
Exp
2arte RoMnson (1856), 1 Bond
39, was a similar petition by the same
Marshal of the same District, who had
been imprisoned by a State Court for
contempt, in not producing the fugitive
slaves. The Marshal claimed the protection of the Act of I833, and LEAviTT,
U. S. Dist. J., said: "It is insisted by
the counsel who oppose the discharge
of the Marshal, that this provision of the
Act of Congress applies only to the case
of a Federal officer who is confined, or
imprisoned, by State authority, under
an unconstitutional State law, and reference is made to the historical fact that
the Act of 1833 was passed to meet the
then existing exigency, growing out of
the threatened opposition of one of the
States of the Union to the national legislation for the imLposition and collection
of duties on imports. To this it may be
replied that whatever may have been
the peculiar circumstances under which
the Act passed, the section above quoted
is still in full force, and obligatory as a
law of the United States. And it may
be fairly inferred that while its purpose

was, at the date of its passage, to provide against a great danger then pending, it has been deemed expedient that
it should be continued, as a remedy
against nullification in any form in which
it might be presented:" Id. 43. The
Marshal was discharged, with a reiterated disclaimer of jurisdiction to review
or reverse the action of the State Judge,
the jurisdiction exercised being solely
under this statutory provision: Id. 49,
50.
Abelman v. Booth (1858), 21 How.
(62 U. S.) 5o6, arose under the Fugitive Slave Law of 185o, Abelman having arrested Booth, under a proper warrant, for aiding and abetting the escape
of a fugitive slave. Booth sued out a
habeas corpus from the State Court,
and in the language of TANEY, C. J.
(writing a year after his Dred Scott decision), "a judge of the Supreme Court
of the State of Wisconsn, in the first
of these cases, claimed and exercised
the right to supervise and annul the
proceedings of a commissioner of the
United States, and to discharge a prisoner, who had been committed by the
commissioner, for an offense against the
laws of this Government, and that this
exercise of power by the judge was
afterwards sanctioned and affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the State. And
it further appears, that the State court
have not only claimed and exercised this
jurisdiction, but have also determined
that their decision is final and conclusive upon all the courts of the United
States, and ordered their clerk to disregard and refuse obedience to the writ
of error issued by this Court pursuant
to the Act of Congress of 1789, to
bring here for examination and revision,
the judgment of the State court. These
propositions are new in the jurispru.
dence of the United States, as well as
of the States; and the supremacy of
the State courts over the courts of the
United States, in cases arising under the
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,Constitution and laws of the United
States, is now, for the first time, asserted
and acted upon in the Supreme Court
-of a State:"

1. 513, 514.

This last

remark is manifestly incorrect. See
Alartin v. ZHenter, suera, a case not
-cited in this opinion, nor in the brief of
Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black.
The issue thus tendered to the United
States Supreme Court was met as de-cidedly by TANEY, as earlier by MAR-

SHALL, for he pointed out that "The
Constitution was not formed merely to
guard the States against danger from
foreign nations, but mainly to secure
union and harmony at home; for, if
this object could be attained, there
would be but little danger from abroad;
and to accomplish this purpose, it was
felt by the statesmen who framed the
Constitution, and by the people who
adopted it, that it was necessary that
-nany of the rights of sovereignty,
which the States then possessed, should
be ceded to the General Government;
and that, in the sphere of action assigned it, it should be supreme and
strong enough to execute its own laws,
by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State, or from State authorities. And it was evident that anything
short of this would be inadequate to
the main objects for which the Government was established; and that local
interests, local passions or prejudices,
incited and fostered by individuals for
sinister purposes, would lead to acts of
aggression and injustice by one State
upon the rights of another, which would
ultimately terminate in violence and
force, unless thcre was a common arbiter between them, armed with power
enough to protect and guard the rights
of all, by appropriate laws, to be carried into execution, peacefully, by its
judicial tribunals." Id. 517.
Apparently, with attention towards
the difficulty which arose in Aartin v.
Hunter, sup#ra, Chief Justice TANEY
VOL. XXXVII.-41

continued: "The appellate power, it
will be observcd, is conferred on this
Court in all cases or suits in which such
a question shall arise. It is not confined to suits in the inferior courts of
the United States, but extends to all
cases where such a question arise,
whether it be in a judicial tribunal of a
State, or of the United States. And it
is manifest that this ultimate appellate
power, in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself, was deemed essential to
secure the independence and supremacy
of the General Government, in the
sphere of action assigned to it; to make
the Constitution and laws of the United
States uniform and the same in every
State; and to guard against evils which
would inevitably arise from conflicting
opinions between the courts of a state
and of the United States, if there was
no common arbiter, authorized to decide
between them. * * * * And, as
the courts of a State, and the courts of
the United States might, and indeed,
certainly would often differ as to the
extent of the powers conferred by the
General Government, it was manifest
that serious controversies would arise
between the authorities of the United
States and of the States, which must be
settled by force of arms, unless some
tribunal was created to decide between
them, finally and without appeal. * *
* * Now, it certainly can be no humiliation to the citizen of the Republic,
to yield a ready obedience to the laws
as administered by the constituted authorities. On the contrary, it is among
his first and highest duties as a citizen,
because free government cannot exist
without it. Nor can it be inconsistent
with the dignity, of a sovereign State,
to observe faithfully, and in the spirit of
sincerity and truth, the compact into
which it voluntarily entered when it became a State of this Union. On the
contrary, the highest honor of sover•eignty is untarnished faith. And- cer-
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tainly no faith could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged, than that
which every State has plighted to the
other States, to support the Consti.ution
as it is, in all its provisions. until they
shall be al:ered in te manner in which
the Constitution i:self prescribes. In
the emphatic language of the pledge required, it is to support this Constitution.
And no I.ower is more clearly conferred
by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, than the power of this
Court, to decide, ul.imately and finally,
all cases arising under such Constitution
and laws; and for that purpose, to
bring here for revision, by writ of error,
the judgment of a State court, where
such questions have arisen, and the right
claimed under them, denied by the
highest judicial tribunal in the State."
Id. 518, 519, 525.
When the Remittiturs from the United
States Supreme Court reached the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, DXoN, C. J.,
delivered an extended opinion (Ableman v. Booth [1859], i Wis. 517),
assenting to the doctrine of Chief Justice
TANEY, and citing i Calhoun's Works,
321, 328, 259; .Mariinv. Bunter, and
Cohens v. Virginia; suPra; I Kent's
Coin. 349; Piqua Bank v. Knoup
(1856), 6 Ohio St. 342; and in a note,
among others, Ferris v. Coover (1858),
II Cal. 175, in which TERRY, C. J. (the
dead man in the principal case), denied
the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act
and the claim of jurisdiction under it, as
above mentioned, saying that "it has
never been admitted in Virginia, has
always been repudiated by Georgia, and
has lately been questioned in several
other States. The decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on this
question embody the political principles
of a party which has passed away. The
reasoning by which it is attempted to
sustain them, is based upon rules of construction now universally regarded as
unwarranted by the letter, or spirit, of
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the Constitution, and directly opposed[
to thoe adop:ed by the same tribunal
in the late case of Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856), x9 How. I6o U. S.) 393,
and in the more recent case [of Peeple's
Ferry Co. v. Be, rs (1857)] in 20 How.
(61 U. S.) 393, in which the admiraltyjurisdiction of State Courts is admitted,
notaithstanding the Ninth Section of
the Judiciary Act. The force and anthorihy of the opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, upon thequestion of jurisdiction, as well as all
others of a political nature, is much
weakened by the consideration that the
political sentiments of the Judges in such
cases necessarily gave direction to the
de'cis.ons of the Court. The Legislativeand Executive power of the Government
had passed, or was rapidly passing, intoG
the hands of men entertaining opposite
principles. Regarding the Judicial as
the conservative department, believing:
the possession by the General Government of greater powers than those expressly granted by the Constitution to
be absolutely necessary to its stability,.
they sought, by a latitudinarian construction of its provisions, to remedy the defects in that instrument, and by a course
of judicial decisions, to give direction
to the future policy of the Union. In.
order to accomplish this end, the Court
almost invariably upheld every assumption of power by the General Government (however at variance with thelimitations of the Constitution), including the alien and sedition law, the embargo act, the charter of the United.
States Bank, and a retrospective bankrupt law; the constitutionality of which
acts is supported by the same course of'
reasoning, and the same liberal construction of the implied powers of Congress, as is applied to the Judiciary Act
of 1789. All the arguments adduced.
in favor of the claim of jurisdiction on
the part of the Federal Court, are
answered, and the unconstitutionality of
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the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary
Act, to my wind, conclusively established, by the able opinions in Hunter
v. Mfartin, 4 Mun. (stra); Padeford
v. M11ayor and Aldermen of Savannah
(1853), x4 Ga. 438; Johnsonv. Gordon
(1854), 4 Cal. 368; and the very elaborate [dissenting] opinion of Mr. Chief
Justice BARTLEY, in the case of the
Piqua Bank v. The Treasurer of
.Miavi County (1856), 6 Ohio St. 342,
in which all the authorities are collated :" ,. 183-4. [But, contra, pages
644 and 645.]
This was not very gracious, as the
same Judge had been released from the
custody of the San Francisco 'Vigilance
Committee to allow him to try a case in
his own Court, by virtue of a habeas
cotzis issued out of the United States
Circuit Court, under the" Fourteenth
Section of the Judiciary Act: Exparte
Des Rochers (1856), I McAllister 68.
The Booth cases were considered as of
ruling authority for the point, that a
State Court had no jurisdiction to issue
a writ of habeascosVsus when the party
was imprisoned by the draft commissioner, a ministeiial officer, for disobedience in not reporting after being
drafted: lt re Spaung er (x863), II
Mich. 298; S. C. 2 A itc. LAw REG.
(N. S.) 598. But DILLON, J., endeav.
ored to exclude imprisonment by a ministerial officer: Ex parle Anderson
(1864), 16 Iowa 595, though "there is
no solid distinction between the two
classes" of imprisonment by ministerial officers and under the judgment of
a judicial tribunal: PAiNE, J.,In re
Talble (1870), 25 Wisc. 396. And
such is the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States, hsfra,
page 644.
When a similar question came again.
before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, PAINE, J. (who had been counsel
for Booth, see I I Wis. 499), defended
the original judgment of that Court in

this wise-" When this Court, in the
Booth case, assumed the power, in the
exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction, to
issue the writ of habeas cipus, to pass
collaterally upon the jurisdiction of the
District Court of the United States, to
pronounce the judgment under which
Booth was imprisoned, it was not assuming any such unwarrantable or unheard of power, as it has been charged
with doing; and that, on the contrary,
whatever might be said as to the correctness of its decision, still, in exercising the right to decide the question, it
was proceeding upon a principle universally recognized, and exercising a
right that is, and must, of necessity, be
exercised by all courts. For there is no
just reasoning upon which any distinction can be asserted between a habeas
coepts and any other judicial proceeding, or suit, in respect to the right of
the Court to decide upon the validity of
the judgment of any other court that
may he drawn in question. * * * A
judgment in a civil suit disposes of the
title to property. A judgment in a
criminal suit disposes of the prisoner's
right to liberty. A civil suit, involving
the title to that property, is the appropriate proceeding in which the juri-diction of the Court to rendler the one
judgment may be drawn into question
collaterally. A proceeding by habeas
cOrpus, may appropriately have the
same effect as to the other :" In re
Tarble (1870), 25 Wis. 399, 40!.

This defence is manif.stly available,
if needed, for the United States Courts,
when the circumstances are reversed.
The real defence of the Wisconsin
Court was expressed, -rater in their
opinion in the same Tarble case, thus"That which was really unusual and
extraordinary was, not that it [the Wisconsin Court, in the Booth case], assumed the power to decide upon the
question, but that, in exercising that
power, it decided against the validity of
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a law passed to sustain the institution of
slavery. The public and judicial mind
of the country was then in such a peculiar state upon that question, that it
was doubtless this fact, together with
the subsequent denial, by this Court, of
the appellate jurisdiction, which was,
in truth, contrary to the entire current
of authority, that so shocked the nerves
of the venerable members of the Supreme Court, that they failed to perceive distinctly the real theory upon
which this Court had assumed the right
to pass collaterally upon the validity of
a judgment even of a Federal Court:
PAINE, J., 25 Wis. 407.
U. S. v. Tarble (1871), 13 Wall. (8o
U. S.) 397, was a writ of error to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, who had
discharged a deserter from the regular
army from the custody of the United
States military authorities, on the ground
that he was a minor. Thejudgmentof
the State Court was reversed in an
opinion by FIELD, J., on the ground that
the State Court had no right to issue the
writ. NELSON, GRIER, CLIFFORD,
SWAYNE,

MILLER,

DAVIS,

BRADLEY

and STRONG, J. J., concurred. CHASE,
C. J., dissented.
The Booth case (supea, p. 640,) was
followed, and the decision therein was
said to dispose "alike of the claim of
jurisdiction by a State court, or by a
State judge, to interfere with the authority of the United States, whether
that authoritybe exercised bya Federal
officer or be exercised by a Federal tribunal :"

Id. 4o3-4.

Continuing, FIELD, J., said: "It is
in the consideration of this distinct and
independent character of the Government of the United States, from that of
the government of the several States,
that the solution of the question presented in this case, and in similar cases,
must be found. There are, within the
territorial limits of each State, two governments, restricted in their spheres of

action, but independent of each other,
and supreme within their respective
spheres. Each has its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and
each has its own tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can
intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its
judicial officers, with the action of the
other. The two governments, in each
State, stand in their respective spheres
of action, in the same independent relation to each other, except in one particular, that they would if their authority
embraced distinct territories. That particular consists in the supremacy of the
authority of the United States, when
any conflict arises between the two governments. * * * * Whenever, therefore, any conflict arises between the
enactments of the two sovereignties, or
in the enforcement of their asserted
authoiities, those of the National Government must have supremacy, until the
validity of the different enactments and
authorities can be finally determined by
the tribunals of the United States. This
temporary supremacy, until judicial decision by the National tribunals, and the
ultimate determination of the conflict by
such decision, are essential to the preservation of order and peace, and the
avoidance of forcible collision between
the two governments. * * * Some
attempt has been made in adjudications,
to which our attention has been called,
to limit the decision of this Court (in
the Booth cases] to cases where a prisoner is held in custody, under undisputed lawful authority of the United
States, as distinguished from his imprisonment under claim and color of such
authority. But it is evident that the
decision does not admit of any such
limitation. * * * * All that is meant
by the language used, is, that the State
judge, or State court, should proceed
no further, when it appears, from the
application of the party, or the return
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made, that the prisoner is held by an
officer of the United States; that is, an
authority, the validity of which is to be
determined by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. If a party thus
held, be illegally imprisoned, it is for
the courts, or judicial officers of the
United States, and those courts or officers alone, to grant him release :" Id.
4o6,407, 410, 411.
The Wisconsin Court had said-" If
there were no appellate jurisdiction, the
argument of convenience, in favor of
the position that all questions as to the
legality of imprisonment, under alleged
Federal authority, should be decided
exclusively by Federal tribunal-, would
be very strong. It would then have
been held that the judicial power of the
United States, over all cases ' arising
under the Constitution and laws,' was
exclusive. But that appellate jurisdiction over the State Courts, exists. It
was provided for by an Act of Congress, at the very outset of the Government. It has been steadily asserted,
and exercised, by the Federal Court;
and, though denied in a few instances
[vide, supra, pages 627, 629 and 643],
by the State Courts. may now be said
tobe universally acquiesced in :" PAINE,
J.,25 Wis. 403. CoiE, J.,concurred,
but DIXON, C. J.,dissented on the
ground afterwards taken by the Supreme
Court of the United States, szupra, that,
in cases of this nature, the jurisdiction
of the United States Courts is exclusive.
In all such cases in the State Courts,
the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of
the United States is not apparently regarded as affcrding much safety to the
liberty of tran-gressors of the laws of
the United Sates.
Ftr, curiou-ly
enough, the cases where the State courts
attempted to exercise jurisdicion do not
seem to be founded upon any incon'enience in applying to the United States
Courts. In fact, "from the beginning

of the Government, down to the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United
States in I858, in the [fugitive slave]
cases of Ableman v. Boo/h and U S. v.
Booth (sitpra,page 640), I suppose the
very decided preponderance of authority
in the State Courts sustains the jurisdiction of those courts, to discharge upon
habeas corpus, prisoners who, in their
judgment, are illegally held, though
held under the authority of the United
States. * * ** Since that decision the
weight of authority, even in the State
Courts, is against the jurisdiction. * * *
The current of opinions in the courts of
the United States is, so far as I know,
absolutely unbroken, except by a single
opinion, recently rendered by the learned
District Judge for the Northern Ditrict
of New York, in the matter of William
Reynolds, on habeascolpus:" BALLARD,

J., it re Farrand (1867), I Abbott
140, 144.

Returning now to the course of decision after Abh,izan v. Booth, nothing
appears until after the extinct'on of
slavery.
The Act of February 5th, 1867 (14
Stat. at L 385), is " An Act to amend"
the Judiciary Act, and provides--" That
the several courts of the United States,
and the several justices and judges of
such courts, within their re-pec.ive jurisdictions, in addition to the authority
already conferred by law, shall have
power to grant writs of hah,as coayus
in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty, in violation of the Constitution, or of any
treaty, or law, of the United States;
and it shall be lawful for such person so
restrained of his, or her, liberty, to apply to ekher of said justices, or judges,
for a writ of habeas coipus, which application shall be in witing, and verified by affida%it, and shall set furth the
facts concerning the detent.on of the
party applying, in whose custody he, or
she, is detained, and by virtue of what
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claim, or authority, if known; and the
said justice, or judge, to whom such
application shall be made, shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus,
unless it shall appear from the petition
itself, that the party is not deprived of
his, or her, liberty, in contravention of
the Constitution, or laws, of the United
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construction of that Act, is whether this
right of appeal extends to all cases of
habeascorpus, or only to a particular
class :" Id. 335. And the Court held
the Act to extend to all appeals.
"Subsequently the case was argued
very thoroughly and ably upon the
merits, and was taken under advisement:
States. * * * 2
While it was thus held, and before conThis statute is incorporated in sec- ference in regard to the decision proper
tions 751, 752, 753, 763 and 765, and
to be made, an Act was passed by Conthe appropriate portions are literally regress (Act, March 27, i868, 15 Stat. at
enacted in sections 754, 755, 756, 757,
L. 44), returned, with objections by the
758, 759, 760, 761 and 766. (Vide,
President, and re-passed by the constisuj.ra, page 597.)
tutional majority, which it is insisted,
Exparte 2li'cCardle (1867), 6 Wall.
takes from this Court jurisdiction of the
(73 U. S.) 318, was a case where a appeal :" CHASE, C. J.° EX parteMchabeas corpus had been issued by the
Cardle (1868), 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 5o6.
United States Circuit Court for the Dis- The Court held that "the Act of 1868
trict of Mississippi, to bring in the body does not except from that jurisdiction
of McCardle, who had been arrested by
any cases but appeals from circuit courts
the military authorities of the United
under the Act of 1867. It does not
States, under the Reconstruction Acts of affect the jurisdiction which was previCongress. The prihoner was remanded,
ously exercised:" Fd. 5.x5, citing the
and from the order remanding him to previous decision in this case, 6 Wall.
the military authorities, he appealed to (73 U. S.) 324. This repealing Act
the Supreme Court of the United States,
was omitted from the Revised Statutes,
and in this form the case was heard on
S764. To the same effect: Ex parte
a motion to dismiss for want of jurisYerger (1869), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 85.
diction; but the Court sustained the
U. S. ex re. Roberts v. The Jailer,
jurisdiction. The citation from the
(1867) 2 Abbott 265, was a hearing
opinion of CHASE, C. J. (supra p. 592),
upon habeas corpus of a special bailiff
was made inf
connection with the conof a marshal, who had been fired upon
struction of the statutory rigl t of appeal
by a person whcm he sought to arrest
given originally " in a small class of
and had returned the fire with fatal efcases, arising from commitments for. fect. The State officials arrested and
acts done or omitted under alleged au- indicted the bailiff and the United
thority of foreign governments, by the
States Circuit Court [for Kentucky,
Act of August 29, 1842 (5 Stat. at L. where the death occurred] granted a
539), which authorized a direct appeal
discharge under the Seventh Section of
from any judgment, upon habeas corpus, the Force Bill. The Commonwealth's
of a justice of this court, or judge of a attorney for the county where the shootdistrict court, to the Circuit Court of the ing occurred, was notified and argued
proper District, and from the judgment
aga:nst the discharge ; to which the
of the Circuit Court to this Court. This
Court answered, on the general subject
provision fcr appeal was transferred,
of jurisdiction,-" By a long course of
with some modification, from the Act of judicial decisions, it may now be con1842 to the Act of 1867; and the first
sidered as settled that this act gives requestion we are to consider, upon the lief to one in State custody, not only

MA' TER OF DAVID

-when he is held under a law of the
State which seeks expressly to punish
him for executing a law or process of
the United States, but also when he is
in such custody under a general law of
the State which applies to all persons
equally, where it appears he is justified
for the act done, because it was done
in pursuance of a law of the United
States, or of a process of a Court or
Judge of the same. * * * The
decisions in the courts of the United
States are absolutely uniform on this
subject, and I find no oppo~ing opinions of any court, except a single one
rendered by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ( Thomas v. Crossin,
supra, page 639). But surely it cannot
be expected that I should attach much
importance to, much less follow, a single
decision of a State Court, opposed as it
is to numerous decisions of the Courts
of the United States, some of them
rendered by Justices of the Supreme
Court. * * * I disclaim all right and
power to discharge the relator on any
such ground as that the proof shows
he acted in sdf-dfence. * * * I
have only to inquire whether what he
did, was done in pursuance of a law
and process of the United States, and
so justI6ed, not excused, by that law
and process. * * * I can discharge only the officer who relies on
the law and process of the United
States; as his sole authority and complete justification:" AI. 277.
But the same Judge, in U. S. ex re.
leeden (1877), 2 Flip, 76, said: "In
writing the opinion, in the case of Robers, supra, I was inclined to think that
a Federal officer was not entitled to
claim his discharge, by simply showing
that he bad done nothing, except what
'he was justified in doing by process, but
that he was obliged to show that he was
justified by his process in doing the very
-thing imputed to him, and for which he
-was in confinement. I am constrained,
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in deference to authority, to modify what
that opinion indicates would be my action, when it appears that the officer is
actually innocent of the crime imputed,
and was faithful in doing all that he.
really did: Exp arteJenh.'ins
, 2 Wall.
537 (sup1ra)."
At this point, the case of U. S. v.
Doss et a4 (1872), Ix AtEiR. LAW REG.
(N. S.) 320, came to trial in the District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. Samuel Snow, a defendant, had
been arrested under a warrant issued by
a Commissioner of the United States,
upon a charge of having in his possession, with the intent'on of passing as
genuine, certain counterfeit obligations
of the United States. He was Lailed,
but afterwards surrendered and committed to jail. McAfee, another defendant, then, as Probate Judge of the
county, issued a writ of habeas corpus,
upon a petition suppressing the facts,
which, however, were made known to
the State Judge by the return made by
the United States Marshal. Snow was
discharged by McAfee, and they, with
Snow's attorney and another person,
were indicted, under the Act of Congress
(Rev. Stat., PR 5398, 5401, for knowingly and wilfully obstructing the United
States Marshal, and for rescuing Snow.
The jury found the Judge and the attorney guilty, and acquitted the other defendants. There was no such violence
as marked the case of E.rpareS'ffrd
(857), 5 AMutR. LAw R.G. kO. S.) 659,
because that was a fugitive slave case,
but the latter case will serve to indicate
the necessity of such convictions, if the
process of the United States Courts is to
be executed.
Ex parte Bridges (1875), 2 Woods
428, was a hearing on hab'as corptts of
Bridges, who had been convicted, in the
Superior Court of Randolph County,
Georgia, of perjury before an United
States Commissioner. BRADLEY(Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) re-
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leased the relator, saying that ""although
it may appear unseemly that a prisoner,
after conviction in a State Court, should
be set at liberty by a single Judge on
habeas cor,us, there seems to be no escape from the law. If it were a case in
which the State Courts had jurisdiction
of the offense, the .general rule of the
common law would intervene, and require that the prisoner should be remanded, and left to his writ of error.
In such a case, although the judgment
were erroneous, the imprisonment would
not be in violation of the Constitution,
or laws, of the United States. The
judgment might be wrong, but the imiprisonment under it would be right,
until the judgment was reversed :" id.
432.
(The relator was discharged, but
immediately rearrested upon a bench
warrant from the United States Court
in Savannah.)
The learned Judge in the last case
called attention to the Act of 1842
(sutra, page 635), as extending the provisions of the Force Bill to foreigners,
for the prevention of the complications
growing out of the Canada rebellion
and the action of the State of New York.
Ex Pate Siebold (1879), 1oo U. S.
371, was a case where certain Judges of
Election had been convicted in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, under Sections 5515
and 5522, Rev. Stat. U. S. They presented petitions for habeas copus, and
the jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court was sustained, as appellate and not original, though no writ of
error could be brought. The discharge
was a-ked for on the ground of the unconstitutionality of these sections, but
the Court thought otherwise and refused
the discharge.
The argument of the Virginia Court
of Appeals, in 1814 (supra,p. 629,) Was
thus answered by BRADLEY, J., though

it does not appear that the case was
even mentioned: "The more general
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reason assigned; to-wit, that the nature
of sovereignty is such as to preclude the
joint co-operation of sovereigns, even in
a matter in which they are mutually
concerned, is not, in our judgment, of
sufficient force to prevent concurrent
and harmonious action en the part of
the National and State governments, in
the election of Representatives. It is,
at most, an agreement ab inconvenienti.
There is nothing in the Constitution to.
forbid such co-operation in this case.
On the contrary, as already said, we
think it clear that the clause of the
Constitution, relating to the regulation.
of such elections, contemplates such.
co operation whenever Congress deems
it expedient to interfere merely to alteror add to existing regulations of the
State. If the two governments had.
entire equality of jurisdiction, there
might be an intrinsic difficulty in such.
co-operation. Then, the adoption bythe State government, of a system of
regulations, might exclude the action of'
Congress. By first taking jurisdiction.
of the subject, the State would require.
exclusive jurisdiction in virtue of a wellknown principle, applicable to courts.
having co-ordinate jurisdiction over the
same matter. But no such equalityexists in the present case. The powerof Congress, as we have seen, is paramount, and may be exercised at anytime, and to any extent, which it deems.
expedient; and, so far as it is exercised,
and no further, the regulations effected
supersede those of the State, which are.
inconsistent therewith :" Id. 391, 392.
The quotations on pages 593 and 599,
sufpra, follow at a little interval. Thenthe same learned Judge proceeds:
"This concurrent jurisdiction, which the
National Government necessarily possesses, to exercise its powers of sovereignty in all parts of the United States,
is distinct from that exclusive power,.
which, by the first article of the Constitution, it is authorized to exercise over-
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the District of Columbia, and over those
places within a State, which are purchased by consent of the Legislature
thereof, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other
needful buildings. There, its jurisdiction is absolutely exclusive of that of
the State, unless, as is sometimes stipulated, power is given to the latter, to
serve the ordinary process of its courts
in the precinct acquired. Without the
concurrent sovereignty referred to, the
National Government would be nothing
but an advisory, government. Its executive power would be absolutely
nullified :" Id. 395. And then follow
the quotations on pages 6o6 and 6oo,
sup ra. And the opinion closes with
these words: "The doctrine laid down
at the close of counsels' brief, that the
State and National Governments are
co-ordinate and altogether equal, on
which their whole argument, indeed, is
based, is only partially true. The true
doctrine, as we conceive, is this, that
whilst the States are really sovereign as
to all matters which have not been
granted to the jurisdiction and control
of the United States, the Constitution
and Constitutional laws of the latter
are, as we have already said, the supreme
law of the land; and, when they conflict with the laws of the States, they
are of paramount authority and obligation. This is the fundamental principle
on which the authority of the Constitution is based; and unless it be conceded
in practice, as well as in theory, the
fabric of our institutions, as it was contemplated by its founders, cannot stand.
The questions involved have respect,
not more to the autonomy and existence
of the States, than to the continued existence of the United States as a government to which every American citizen may look for security and protection
in every part of theland:" Id. 398, 399.
The Court was composed of WAITE,
C.J., and CLIFFORD, SWAYNE, MILLER,

FIELD, STRONG, BRADLEY,

HARLAN,

J. J.

FIELD,

HuNT, and

J., filed a dis-

senting opinion, in which CLIFFORD, J.,
concurred. But, in the course of that
dissent, the learned Judge was careful
to say: "It was the purpose of the
framers of the Constitution to create a
government which could enforce its own
laws, through its own officers and tribunals, without reliance upon those of
the States, and thus avoid the principal
defect of the Government of the Confederation: and they fully accomplished
their purpose:"

A.

413.

And, with

somewhat peculiar inaptness to the
present tragic incident, the same learned
Judge says: "It is true that, since the
recent amendments of the Constitution,
there has been legislation by Congress,
asserting, as in the instance before us.
[of regulating Congressional Elections],
a direct control over State officers which
previously was never supposed to be
compatible with the independent existence of the States in their reserved
powers. * * * They give to the Federal
Government the power to strip the
States of the right to vindicate their
authority in their own courts, against a.
violator of their laws, when the transgressor happens to be an officer of the
United States, or alleges that he is denied, or cannot enforce, some right
under their laws. * * * In my judgment, and I say it without intending
any disrespect to my associates, no such
advance has ever before been made toward the conversion of our Federal system into a consolidated and centralized
government:" Id. 413,414.

Tennessee v. Davis (1879), 100 U. S.
257, is probably the most interesting of
all the citations in the principal case.
Davis had been indicted in the State
Court for murder, and, before trial, was.
permitted to remove the proceedings tothe United States Circuit Court, on the
ground that he had not committed murder at all, but that he had acted in self
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defence, while in performance of his
duty as United States Deputy Ccllctor
of Internal Revenue. This was in accordance with Section 643, Rev. Stat.
U.S. The State made a mot on to remand, but was denied. "1he opinion was
written by STRONG, J., and WAITE, C. J.,
and SWAYNE, MILLER, BRADLEY, HUNT
and HARLAN, J.J., concurred. CLIFFORD and FIELD, J.J., dissented.
In delivezing the opinion of the Court,
STRONG, J., said: "We come, then, to
the inquiry most discussed during the
argument, whether Section 643 is a constitntinal exerche of the power vested
in Congress. Has the Con.titution conferred upon Congress the power to
au:horizc the removal from a State Court
to a Federal Court, of an indictment
against a revenue officer, for an alleged
crime against the State, and to order its
removal before trial, when it appears
that a Federal question, or a claim to a
Federal right, is raised in the case, and
"must be decided therein?" Id. 262.
Then follows the quotation, supra, page
601. The answer was in the affirmative.
Commenting on the judicial power of
the Nation, as declared by the Second
Section of the Third Article of the Cons~iuition, the same Judge said: "This
provi~ion embraces alike civil and criminal cases arising under the Const;tution
and laws: Colhens v. IJY',:nia (182I),
6 Wheat. (19 U. S.) 39c. Both are
equally within the domain of the judicial powers of the United States, and
there is nothing in the grant to justify
an assertion that whatever power may
be exerted over a civil case, may nt be
exerted as fully over a criminal one.
And a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States may
as well arise in a criminal prosecution
as in a civil suit [vide szfra, rage 629].
What constitutes a case. thus arising
was early defined in the case cited from
6 Wheaton [Cohens v. Vrginia : vide
.st.Pra,pages 630, 632, 633] :" Id. 264.

In effect, answering the sentiments
early advanced (stpra, pages 627, 629),
the same Judge said: "If, whenever
and wherever a case arises under the
Constitution and laws, or treaties, of the
United States, the National Government
cannot take control of it, whether it be
civil or criminal, in any stage of its progress, its judicial power is at least temporarily silenced, instead of being at all
times supreme. * * In~leed, the powers
of the General Government and the lxwfulness of authority exercised, or claimed
under it, are quite as frequcnily in question in criminal caseg in State Courts as
they are in civil cases, in proportion to
their number. * * ** Bfore the adoption of the Constitution, each State had
complete and exclusive authority to administer, by its courts, all the law, civil
and criminal, which existed within its
borders. Its judicial power extended
over every legal question that could
arise. But when the Constitut'on was
adopted, a portion of that judicial power
became vested in the new Government
created, and so far as thus vested,it was
withdrawn from the sovereignty of the
State. Now, the execution and enforcement of the laws of the United States,
and the judicial determination of questions arising under them, are confided
to another sovereign, and to that extent
thesovere;gnty ofthe State is rest ieted:"
Al. 266, 267.
FIELD and CLIFFORD, J. J., dissented, the latter advancing the same
objection raised in the principal case
(supra, p-ge 5 9 S)-" Neither the Constitution, nor the Acts of Congres, give
a revenue officer, or any other oilicer of
the United StateA, an immunity to commit murder in a State, or I rohil it the
State from executing its laws for the
punishment of the offender. Unquestionable jurisdiction to try and punish
offenders against the auhority of the
United States is conferred upon the Circuit and District Courts; but the Acts
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of Congress give those Courts no jurissey v. The Jailer (1879), 2 Flip. 457,
came before the United States District
diction whatever of offences committed
Court for Kentucky. A deputy United
against the authority of a State. Criminal homicide, committed in a State, is States Marshal had killed a citizen of
Kentucky, while in the discharge of his
,an offense against the authority of the
State, unless it was committed in a duty, and the State authorities had arrebted the Marshal. The United States
place within the exclusive jurisdiction
District Court issued a habeas corpus,
of the United States. * * * When
and, after hearing, discharged the Marcorrectly understood, it is clear that the
second case [Cohensv. Virginia,supra, shal. The State Court then issued a
bench warrant and the United Sta.es
page 6301, cannot have any tendency
Court again released the Marshal.
whatever to support the proposition that
Again the State Court took advantage
an indictment for wilful and felonious
of the Marshal being in that Court and
murder, with malice aforethought, pendordered him into custody. Again the
ing in the State Court, and found by a
Grand Jury of the State under a statute United States Court released the Marshal, and inisted that their deciion
-of the State, not involving any Federal
should be respected, fullowing the fuquestion, may be removed from the
gitive slave cases, sitfra, page 637. The
State Court into the Circuit Court, for
trial, merely because the prisoner, at learned judge (BAI.ARD, J.), stated"I think, although this question has not
the time he committed the homicide,
been very directly passed upon I y the
-was a Deputy Collector of internal revSupreme Ccurt of the United States, it
enue. Such a proposition, unsupported
is plainly touched upon in the ca,-e of
by any respectable judicial authority, is
Coleman v. Tennessee (I878), 97 U. S.
,only calculated to excite amazement, as
509. There a party, a soldier of the
the case c4ed is a direct and conclusive
authority the other way, showing to a United States, during the war, killed a
citizen of Tennessee, and the charge
demonstration, that the Federal Courts
cannot exercise any jurisdiction what- was nmurder. The Judge of the United
States Court issued his writ of habeas
ever in a criminal case properly pending in a State Court, unless it involves coypts, and discharged him. He was
subsequently tried in the State Court,
some question arising under the first
and among the defenses made, was the
clause of the second section of the
defense that lie had been di-charged by
article describing the judicial power
the United States Court; and there was
conferred by the Constitution: 2 Story,
another defense, that for anything done
Const., H 1721, 174o; i Kent, Coon.
by him, during the war, he was not
12th ed., 299; Sergeant, Const. 59;
amenable to the Stae of Tcnnes,,ee.
Curtis, Com., ?.9; Pomeroy, Cost., 2nd
Now, the case in the Supreme Court
76o :" Id. 281, 289.
ed.,
went off chiefly on the latter point, Lut
After the death of Justice CLIFFORD,
and when the Court was composed of they also stated, substantially, that the
NVAITE, C. J., and MILLER, FIELD, judgment of the United States Court,
discharging the prisoner, was a de-BRADLEY, HARLAN, WOODS, MATfense :" .11 453-4. The opinion of
THEWs, GRAY and BLATCHFORD, J. J.,
the United States Supreme Court was
the principle upon which the last case
delivered by FIELD, J., (CI.FIFORD, J.,
was decided Wvas affirmed in an opinion
by MATTHEWS, J.: Davis v. South dissenting,) and upon this precise point,
ELr pare Yerger (supra, page 646,)
Carolina(1882), 107 U. S. 597.
In the previous month of May, Ram- was cited as authority
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Robb v. Connoily (1884), 1II U. S.
624, was a case where the agent of the
State of Oregon had been adjudged in
contempt by a California Court, upon
being served with a habeas cortus, for
not producing a fugitive whom he had
arrested in California by virtue of a
warrant of the Governor of California,
issued on the requisition of the Governor of Oregon. The agent claimed
to be acting under the authority of the
United States, but the Supreme Court
of the United States held that he was
not an officer appointed by, and owing
a duty to, the United States; and so the
Booth and Tarble cases were distinguished. HARLAN, J.,in delivering
the opinion, called attention to the fact
that thd question had never before been
determined in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and added: "Underlying
the entire argument in behalf of the
plaintiff in error is the idea that the jndicial tribnals of the States are excluded
altogether from the consideration and
determination of questions involving an
authority, or a right, privilege, or immunity, derived from the Constitution and
laws of the United States. But this
view is not sustained by the statutes defining and regulating the jurisdiction of
the Courts of the United States. * * * *
So that a State Court of original jurisdiction, having the parties before it, may,
consistently with existing Federal legislation, determine cases at law, or in
equity, arising under the Constitution,
or laws of the United States, or involving rights dependent upon such Constitution or laws. Upon the State Courts,
equally with the Courts of the Union,
rests the obligation to guard, enforce
and protect every right, granted or secured by the Constitution of the United
States and the laws made in pursuance
thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit, or proceeding, before
them. *

*

*

*

It is proper to say

that we have not overlooked the recent
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opinion of the learned Judge of the
Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of California [SAWYER, J.],
in In re Robb (I884), tg Fed. Repr.
26. But we have not been able to reach
the conclusion announced by him:"
[that the agent of the State of OregoL
was pro hoc vice, an officer of the
United State] : Id. 635, 637, 639.
Later, in ExpareRoyal (1885),1i7
U. S. 241, the principle of this decision
was said to be sound, as having been
held upon full consideration; but, it
was also said by the same learned Justice, "it is clear that if the local statute, under which Royal was indicted,
be repugnant to the Constitution, the
prosecution against him has nothing
upon which to rest, and the entire proceeding against him is a nullity :" 2"d.
248. The case raised the question
whether the United States Circuit Court
had "jurisdiction, on habeas corpus, to
discharge from custody one who is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
National Constitution, but who, at the
time, is held under State process for
trial, on an indictment charging him
with an offense against the laws of the
State: (Id. 245), in selling coupons
without a license. Thejurisdiction was
sustained upon the authority of Ear
tare Yarbrough (1883), n1o U. S.
654; Ablemnan v. Booth; Ex parteSiebold; Tarbie's case, and Robb v.
Connelly, supra. "That the petitioner
is held under the authority of a State,
cannot affect the question of the power,
or jurisdiction, of the Circuit Court, to.
inquire into the cause of the commitment, and to discharge him, if he be
restrained of his liberty in violation of'
the Constitution. The grand jurors.
who found the indictment, the Court
into which it was returne4, and by whose
officer he was arrested, and the officer
who holds him in custody, are all,
equally with individual citizens, under
a duty, from the discharge of which the
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State could not release them, to respect
and obey the supreme law of the land,
anything in the Constitution and laws,
,of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding:'" Id. 249. The time when
th e United States Courts should act, was
held also to be in their discretion, so
that forbearance towards the State
Courts might be exercised, even if it

28 Fed. Repr. 924 (affirmed the same
year, 120 U.S. 11); U. S. v. Rauscher (1886), 119 U. S. 407; InreReinitz (1889), 39 Fed. Repr. 204; in election cases: Expare Turner (1879), 3
Woods (U. S.) 603; Ex tarte Geissler
(188o), 4 Fed. Repr. 188; ElectoralCollege of Soth Carolina,I Hughes (1876),
571 ; in the execution of a replevin, issued from the United States Court: Ex

put the accused to a writ of error from
the highest Court of the State; and
.ExarleBridges, supra, page 647, was
quoted with approval. In the same
term, this same principle of forbearance
-was followed in Ex pareFonda (1885),
117 U. S. P16, and was applied in Ex
tarteHanson(1886), 28 Fed. Repr. 127.
The principles laid down in the preceding cases were made the basis for
the decisions upon the jurisdiction of
the United States Courts, in interpreting
the United States laws : N. 0., etc., R. R.
Co. v. Mliss. (1880), 1O2 U. S. 135; U
S. v. Lee (1882), io6 Id. 196; Covell

pare Thompson (1876), I Flippin 507.
Note should here be made that, for
want of space, this annotation does not
include any late cases of release of citizens and foreigners, held under the
operation of void State laws, or judgments of State Courts: e.g., In re Loney
(1889), 38 Fed. Repr. ioi, affirming
Ex pare Bridges, si-ra,page 647. (S.
c. sub noa. Brown v. U. S., ex rel.
Bridges, 14 AMER. LAw REG. 566,
where a fuller statement of the facts is
given, together with the opinion of ERS-

". Heyman (1883), 111 Id. 176; S/a-in v. N. Y. (1885), 115 Id. 248; Ex
)Pare Hanson (1886), 28 Fed. Repr:
127; Jn e ,4hJow(i886), 29 Id. z81;
Findley v. Satterfield (1877), 3 Woods
(U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep.) 504, where there
are some interesting historical remarks
on the Force Bill and the Act of
1842; in removal cases upon criminal
charges: Exparte Turner (1879), Id.
603; Georgiav. O'Grady (18 7 6), A.
496; Statev. Port (1880), 3 Fed. Repr.
117; Georgia v. Bolton (1882), I1 Id.
217; in cases arising from enlistment of
minors in the Army of the United States:
in re Farrand(1867), 1 Abb. (U. S.)
140; it reNeill(I871),S Blatchf. 156;
in extradition cases: Ii re Bull (I 877),
4 Dillon 323; In te Wfildenhus (1886),

So, too, the question of the executive
power which directed the Deputy Marshal to accompany Justice FIELD, is too
wide to be appended to a discussion of
the chosen point in the decision of the
principal case. And the same is true
of the cognate question of the powers of
United States Marshals and their deputies, in preserving peace.
The fundamental question in the
principal case was what summary relief
could the United States extend to its
officer, when a particular State not only
failed of its duty, but also sought to
subject to a criminal prosecution that
officer who acted in the emergency as
an officer, and, as he believed, in obedience to his instructions.
JOHN B. UHLE.

KINE, J.)

DOBBIN V. CORDINER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
DOBBIN v. CORDINER.
A married woman is estopped from obtaining the cancelation of her deed, regularly executed and acknowledged and subsequently delivered by her husband to
an innocent purchaser, notwithstanding the proof that at the time of the execution
and acknowledgment of the deed, there was a blank for the name of thegrautee,
and that the wife did not know what property the deed conveyed.

Appeal from the District Court of Hennepin County.
Hart & Brewer for appellant.
Wilson & Lawrence for respondent.
DICKINSON, J., July 2, 1889. This action is prosecuted
for the purpose of securing the cancelation of a deed of conveyance from the plaintiff and her husband to the defendant.
The plaintiff seeks to avoid the deed upon the grounds, that,
as she alleges, the deed when executed by her, was incomplete,
not containing the name of the grantee, nor any description ofthe property conveyed; that by her husband's misrepresentations, she was induced to sign and acknowledge the instrument in its incomplete form, and that he afterward, without
her authority, inserted the name of the defendant as grantee,
and the description of the property, and delivered the deed to
the defendant.
By the findings of the Court, the following facts are established: The land had been purchased by the plaintiffs husband, who paid a part of the purchase price. The conveyance
was made to the plaintiff, who gave a mortgage upon the property for an unpaid part of the purchase price. That the plaintiff's husband, having bargained with the defendant for the sale
of the land to him, prepared a deed for the conveyance of the
property, complete in form, except that it did not contain the
name of any grantee. He requested the plaintiff to execute
it, and without objection she signed and acknowledged it, the
husband also joining in the execution of it. She delivered
the deed after her acknowledgment to her husband, for the
purpose of completing and delivering it to the purchaser. The
husband then wrote in the name of the defendant as grantee,
delivered it to him and the latter received the deed, paid the
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price to the plaintiff's husband in good faith without notice of
any defects or omissions in the making or execution of the
deed.
He assumed as part of the consideration the .payment of the
outstanding mortgage on the property. The plaintiff's allegations as to the fraudulent procuring of her execution of the
deed were not sustained by the findings of the Court.
It is conceded on the part of the appellant, the plaintiff, that,
in general, one executing a deed of conveyance may give authority to another, by parol, to insert in the deed, after its execution, the name of a grantee, the grantee not having been
before named in the deed; but it is contended that a wife cannot confer such authority upon her husband. We deem it
unnecessary to decide whether this distinction can be recognized. Without regard to that question, and however it might
be decided, we are of the opinion that by her conduct, the
plaintiff is precluded, upon the principle of estoppel, from asserting, as against the defendant, the invalidity of this deed.
Our statutes have gone far to remove the common law disability of married women. The property held by them at the
time of marriage, continues to be their separate property after
marriage. They may, during coverture, receive, hold, use and
enjoy property of all kinds, and the rents, issues and profits
thereof, and all avails of their contracts and industry, free from
the control of their husbands. They are capable of making
contracts by parol, or under seal. They are bound by their
contracts, and responsible for their torts, and their property is
liable for their debts and torts, to the same extent as if they
were unmarried. Their power to contract, and to convey real
estate, is, however, so far qualified, that they cannot contract
with their husbands relative to the real estate of either, or by
power of attorney, or otherwise, authorize their husbands to
convey their real estate, or any interest therein; and, in general, in all conveyances, by married women, of their real estate, their husbands must join.
Married women cannot enjoy these enlarged rights of action
and of property, and remain irresponsible for the ordinary
legal and equitable results of their conduct. Incident to this
power of married women to deal with others, is the capacity
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to be bound, and to be estopped, by their conduct, when
the enforcement of the principle of estoppel is necessary
for the protection of those with whom they deal; although
there are, without doubt, limitations upon the application
of this doctrine: Norton v. Nichols (876), 35 Mich. 148;
Reed v. Morton (1888), 24 Neb. 760; Knight v. Thayer
(1878), 125 Mass. 25; Bodine v. Killeen (873), 53 N. Y. 93;
Powelfs Appeal (1881), 98 Pa. 403; Fryer v. Rishell (1877),
84 Id. 521 ; Godfrey v. Thornton (1879), 46 Wis. 677; La-vasser v. Wf:ashburn (I880), 50 Id. 200; Baum v. Mullen
(1872), 47 N. Y. 577; Patterson v. Lawrence (1878), 9o Ill.
174; Reis v. Lawrence (1883), 63 Cal. 129; Sharpe v. Fay
.(i868), L. R. 4 Ch. 35; In re Lush's Trusts (I869), Id. 591;
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 814.
This plaintiff had power to convey her estate by deed, in
which her husband should join. ,She executed and acknowledged this deed, knowing that it was a deed of conveyance,
and contemplating that it was to be delivered, and have effect
as such, and that the purchaser would pay a consideration
therefor. The deed was delivered, as she intended it should
be, to a purchaser, who in good faith, supposing the conveyance to be in all respects valid and effectual, has paid the consideration therefor. Even if her authority to her husband,
implied from the circumstances, to fill in the name of the
grantee, was ineffectual to legally empower him to do so, she
ought not now to be allowed in a court of equity, to defeat the
title of the purchaser upon that ground. A grantor not under
disability from coverture, would be estopped under such circumstances: Pence v. Arbuckle (1876), 22 Minn. 417. It is
equitable that the same principle be applied here for the protection of the defendant; and to so apply it, does not, we think,
defeat the purposes of the statute declaring invalid any power
of attorney or other authority, as between husband and wife,
to convey real estate.
It is immaterial in our view of the case, whether or not, there
was an express authorization of the husband to fill in the name
of the grantee. It is enough that the plaintiff intended the
instrument to have effect as a conveyance, and that she allowed
her husband to take it, after she had executed it, for the pur-
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pose of delivering it to the purchaser, as a deed of conveyance
executed by her. That the plaintiff supposed that her husband was to deliver this deed to the purchaser, is shown by
her own testimony.
The extent of the proof, on the part of the plaintiff, as to the
misrepresentations of her husband, was that he said to her,
when he asked her to execute the deed, that he would like to
sell a lot. Without considering what might have been the
effect of fraudulent misrepresentations of the husband, in a
case where the wife was not chargeable with negligence in the
transaction, we regard this evidence as wholly insufficient to
justify the granting of relief as against an innocent purchaser.
With regard to the rights of purchasers, it was culpable negligence on the part of the plaintiff to execute the conveyance,
unless she is to be bound by it. The language of her husband did not justify her in executing the deed without reading
it, or at least without more definite information as to its contents, unless she was willing to allow the deed to have effect
whatever the property conveyed might be. It is therefore unnecessary to pass upon the question of the admissibility of the
husband's testimony going to rebut the plaintiff's testimony in
this particular, and which, as it seems, the Court below did
not consider.
The deed was effectual as a conveyance, although there was
but one subscribing witness: forton v. Leland(I88o), 27 Minn.
36; Johnson v. Sandkoff (1883), 30 Id. 197; Conlan v. Grace
(I886), 36 Id. 276.
The evidence justified the findings of fact.
Judgment affirmed.
With all due deference" to this learned
Court, it is difficult to understand how
and in what way the doctrine of estoppel is applicable to this case. If the
wife had capacity to execute a deed containing blanks, it is valid, and if she had
not the capa ity, it is not valid. The
question is one of capacity to execute
such a deed, and not one of estoppel.
If she had capacity to execute the deed,
VOL. XXXVII.-42

then the doctrine of estoppel might
arise, but no act of her own, or false
representation, can confer upon her a
capacity which she has not under the
law. On the other hand, if a ferne
covert can execute a deed with one
blank, she cart do so with two or more
blanks, Lecause the principle is the
same, and thus blank deeds might Le
executed. If she has the capacity to
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execute such a deed, then her acts constituting her husband her agent, might
raise the question of estoppel; but it
must first be settled that she has this
capacity.
Now, she has or has not this capacity by virtue of the enabling statutes.
The Minnesota statute is substantially
those of the other States, except the
provision prohibiting the wife from contracting with her husband concerning
her real estate, or authorizing him to
convey any interest therein.
The proposition is, a married woman
cannot execute a deed with blanks in it.
At common law she could not convey
her own land by any direct mode of
alienation. To circumvent this, fines
and recoveries were introduced, the essential part of which was the judicial
privy examination. In equity, the doctrine of thejus disonendi of the separate estate was, after a long struggle,
settled to be, that the feme covert had
no power to dispose of the separate estate but that conferred by the instrument which created it. By the fine and
common recovery, the privy examination could only be taken upon a completed assurance; that is to say, a deed
could not be executed, if there were any
blanks in iL By the equity doctrine of
jus disponendi,she could only dispose
of her estate in the specific mode and
manner pointed out in the instrument
creating it. Hence, under both jurisdictions, a feme covert's deed was required to strictly comply with the mode
and manner prescribed. The enabling
statute takes the place of both of these
methyls, and is controlled by the rule
applicable to those methods, namely,
that a feme covert has no capacity to
dispose of her statutory estate, but in
the mode and manner specifically
pointed out in the statute. This rule is
not applicable to conveyances by persons sui juris; hence the question,
whether or not a person suijuris, can

execute a deed containing blanks, must
not be mixed with the question, whether
or not a married woman can do it.
The identical question involved in.
the principal case, was decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States in
Drury v. Foster (1864), 2 Wall. (69 U.
S.) 24. In that case, the mortgage of
the wife's Minnesota land, was drawn
with blanks for the mortgagee's name
and the sum to be borrowed. The wife
executed it in this shape, knowing that
the blanks were to be filled up by the
husband. The deed was delivered to
the husband, to enable him to borrow
the money. Drury agreed to loan
$12,8oo, and thereupon the husband inserted Drury's name as mortgagee, and
the amount. The Court held that the
mortgage was void as to the wife, because under the Minnesota statute, and
the common law, she cannot execute a.
deed by procuration; cannot authorize
any one to fill up the blanks and deliver the mortgage; there could be no.
acknowledgment, until the blanks were
filled; until then, there was no deed to.
be acknowledged; and her act and the
act of the officer were nullities.
" It is insisted, however," said the
Court, "that Mrs. Foster should be estopped from denying that she signed.
and acknowledged the mortgage. The
answer is this, that to permit an estoppel
to operate against her, would be a virtual repeal of the statute that extends to
her this protection (the privy examination upon a completed deed), and also
a denial of the disability of the common law that foibids the conveyance of
her real estate by procuration. It would
introduce into the law an entirely new
system of conveyances of the real property of feme coverts. Instead of the
transaction being a real one, in conformity with established law, conveyances by signing and acknowledging
blank sheets ofpaper, would be the only
formalities required. The consequences
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of such a system are apparent and
need not be stated." And that, whilst
the weight of cases held that parol authority was sufficient to authorize the
alteration or addition to sealed instruments, executed by persons sui juris,
yet this could not be done by a married
woman, because it would be a virtual
repeal of the statute, which requires a
privy examination upon a completed
deed, and the Minnesota statute, which
prohibits such authorization to a husband, and also a denial of the common
law, which forbids the conveyance of a
married woman by procuration.
Upon the same question, and a similar state of facts, Judge DILLON, in
Simmes v. .Jervey (1865), 19 Iowa 273,
held that the mortgage was void, because executed without the name of the
grantee, and description of the property;
stating, after a careful review of the
cases, that it was safer to deny the power
by parol, to fill the blanks after the execution of the mortgage, unless re-delivered, confirmed, ratified, or adopted;
and distinguished that case from O1cHenmy v. Day (1863), 13 Iowa 445;
and Baldwin v. Snowdin (IS6o), Ii
Ohio St. 203.
In Burnr and Mi/ev. Lynde (1863),
6 Allen (Mass.) 305, the Court held
that a printed deed, signed and sealed
in blank by a married woman, the
blanks filled up in her absence, but by
her patol authority, was void, unless
afterwards re-delivered, Qr adopted,
when in a completed state; because any
other rule would be dangerous and subversive of public policy, substituting
parol evidence for the sanctity of a deed.
The principle involved is well enforced
in this opinion.
These are the leading cases, decided
by well-known jurists, after careful consideration and exhaustive research;
they are founded upon the fact that a
married woman's capacity to convey
comes from the statute. The mode and

manner prescribed by the statute must
be strictly followed.
The rule at common law, in equity,
and under the statute, is the same, which
is, that she has no power to dispose but
that conferred in the instrument creating
it, and if this instrument, or the power
creating the estate, provided that the
disposition, or alienation, must be by
deed duly executed and delivered after
privy examination, that requirement
must be complied with. Underthefine
and recovery, it was required that the
deed be complete, containing the
grantor, the grantee, and the thing
granted, duly executed and delivered
upon privy examination. Inequity, the
power of appointment, and the power
of disposition, were restricted to the
mode and manner specifically pointed
out in the instrument. The same rule
applies to the statute. Hence, drawing
from the principles which controlled
the fine and recovery, and the doctrine
of jus disponendi, the rule under the
statute is that a married woman has no
capacity but that which is conferred by
the statute, and that power-jus disponendi-must be strictly followed. The
manner and form must be strictly pursued. If formalities are prescribed,
these must be followed. If signing and
sealing were required, that must be performed. If the jus disponendi is required by instrument in writing, duly
acknowledged, that musi be strictly followed. If a l.rivy examination was requircd it meant such examination of a
completed instrument, and in no instance was the jts dispon,ndi allowed
to be exercised by blank deed or by
procuration. The principle that the
statute is the instrument creating the
separate estate, and regulates the manner and form of thejs d.ponendi and
must therefore be stric:ly pursued, is the
reason for that class of cases which hold
that if the conveyance cf a feme covert
is not executed according to the man-
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ner and form prescribed by the stututc
it is void: Morrison v. Wilson (1859),
13 Cal. 498; Elliott v. Piersol(1828),
1 Pet. (26 U. S.) 328 ; Heburnv. .Dubois (z838), x2 Id. (37 U. S.) 345;
West v. West (1823), to S. & R. (Pa.)

445; James v. Fiske (1847), 9 S. &
M. (Miss.) 152; Jenkins v. McConico
(1855), 26 Ala. 213; Palmerv- Cross
(1843), 1 S. & M. (Miss.) 48; Maclay v. Love (x864), 25 Cal. 374; Dentzel v. Waldie (1866), 30 Id. 142; Bodley v. Ferguson (1866), 30 Id. 517;
Mlcintosh v. Smith (1847), 2 La. An.
758; Bisland v. Provosty (1859), 14
Id. 169; Lowell v. Daniels (1854), 2
Gray (Mass.) x61; Keen v. Hartman
(1865) 48 Pa. 497; Bemis v. Call
(1865), 1o Allen (Mass.) 512; Glidden
v. Strupler (1866), 52 Pa. 400; Todd

v. R. R. (1869), ig Ohio St. 514; Lothrp v. Foster (t863), 51 Me. 367.
The cases cited by the Minnesota
Court do not apply to the question involved in the case before it, except that
of Reed v. Mlorton, infra, which does
not appear to have been well considered. Horton v. Nichols (1876), 35
Mich. 148, was a case of irregular acknowledgment, and not of capacity to
make the acknowledgment; and the
cases cited by the Michigan Court to
support its position (Sharpe v. Foy
(1868), L. R. 4 Ch. 35, and it re
Lush's Trust (1869), Id. 591), were
cases of the wife's equity to a settlement under the English doctrine; the
former holding her right to the equity
was barred by her recital in her duly
executed deed; and the latter that
her regular and lawful assignment of
her reversionary interest in a trust fund,
barredher equity to a settlement. The
case of Knight v. Thayer (1878), 125
Mass. 25, held that the wife's covenant
of warranty, in her lawfully executed
deed, was binding, and not that she had
capacity to make the deed. In Powel's
A42eal (188I), 98 Pa. 403, the wife's

release of her legacy was held good
because she had capacity to dispose of
this chose in action. In Bodinev.Killeen (1873), 53 N. Y. 93, the wife
was held bound by her contract entered
into through her agent. She was lawfully conducting the grocery business,
and her husband was her lawful agent
in creating the obligation sued on. This
was a case of agency, not a case of
capacity to execute a blank deed, and
the general proposition made by this
Court in this case, so often misapplied,
that to the extent a married woman is
empowered to contract, she may be
bound in the same manner as if unmarried, is correct as applied to the case
in hand and as a general proposition,
but here, as in other cases, the capacity
to make the contract must be first settied. In Fryer v. Rishell (1877); 84
Pa. 521, the wife's application to rescind her assignment of a contract to
purchase realty, was refused, unless the
consideration received was restored.
Godfrey v. Thornton (1879), 46 Wis.
677, held that the wife's mortgage,
without attestation, or acknowledgment,
was valid, because the statute conferred
the power, and she complied with the
statutoryjus dis~ponendi. This was the
ruling in the cited case of Lavassar v.
Washburne (188o), 50 Wis. 200. In
Baum v. Mullen (1872), 47 N. Y. 577,
the wife was held responsible for the
fraudulent representations of her husband, who was her agent in the transaction. Patterson v. Lawrence(1878),
90 Ill. 174, asserted the principle in
Fryer v. Rihell, sup ra, and followed the Illinois doctrine, that estoppel comes from tort, not contract, as announced in. Oglesby Coal Co. v. Pasco
(1875), 79 Ill. 164; Schwartz v. Saunders (1867), 46 Id. 18; Anderson v.
Armstead (t873), 69 Id. 452, and does
not touch the question whether she can
execute a deed in blank. In Reis v.
Lawrence (x883), 63 Cal. 129, the wife's
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deed was held valid, although her divorce was void, because all her property rights and the rights of others, acquired under the impression that the
deed was good, were protected on the
ground of public policy.
The Nebraska case of Reed v. Alorton (1888), 24 Neb. 760, sustains the
position that a feme covert can execute
a blank deed. It is true that other elements also existed, namely, that it was
in the hands of an innocent purchaser,
and that the wife knew, when executing it in blank, that her husband would
fill the blanks, obtain the money, and
deliver the deed. The infirmity of this
case lies in the fact that it is against the
leading cases and principles; and the
cases which it cites do not support its
position, because they are cases of persons suijurs. Besides, the Nebraska
statute does not inhibit, as does the
Minnesota statute, deeds made by procuration.
It remains, therefore, to be shown
that the true principle involved in the
question (whether or not a married woman can execute a deed with blanks in
it) is that declared in Drury v. Foster
(1864), 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 24; Burns
v. Lynde (1863), 6 Allen (Mass.) 305.
This was applied to the deed of a
femne covert, in Hibblewhite v. Ale.hornil (I84o), 6 M. & NV. 2o0, after
an exhaustive discussion of the cases,
and expressly overruled the case of Texira v. Evans (cited in AMaster v. Jliller
(179), 1 Anst, at p. 228). The line
of cases which follow the doctrine that
a married woman' is estopped from seeking the invalidity of her deed executed
in blank, begin at that case, as authority
for this doctrine of estoppel. In that
case, Lord MANSFIELD decided that a
personal bond, executed in blank by a
person suijuris,could be subsequently
filled by parol authority; not that a
married woman or a person under disability, could do this.

Yexira v. Evans, srupra, has been
followed in Wooley v. Constant (i8o9),
4 Johns. (N. Y.) 54; Ex parte Aferwin (1828), 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 118;
Bank of Buffalo v. A.ortright (1839),
22 lVend. (N. Y.) 348; Chauncy v.
Arnold (1862), 24 N.Y. 330; Wiley
v. Mloor (1828), 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 438;
Boardman v. Gare (1829), i Stew.
(Ala.) 517 ; Richnond AIfg. Co. v.
Davis (845), 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 412;
and disapproved and rejected in Boyd
v. Boyd (x819), 2 N. & McC. (S. C.)
125; Gilbert v. Anthony (I821)', I
Yerg. (Tenn.) 69; Bers v. AfcClanahan
(1834), 6 G. & J.(Md.) 250; Ayers v.
Harness (1824), i Ohio 368; U. S. v.
Nelson (1822), 2 Brock. (U. S. C. Ct.,
Dist. Va.) 64; People v. Organ (1861),
27 Ill.
27 ; Davenporlv. Sleight (1837),
2 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 381 ; Aing v.
Brooks (1848), 9 Ired. (N. C.) 218;
Cross v. State Bank (1845), 5 Ark. 525;
elMcilftrty v. Frank (1826), 4 T. B.
Mon. (Ky.) 39; Arrington v. Burton
(183x), i9 Ala. 114.
"No person," said RUFFIN, Ch. J.,
in Davenportv. Sleight (1837), 2 Dev.
& Bat. 381, " will argue in favor of a
deed of conveyince in which the name
of the bargaine, or the description of
the land, was inserted after the execution by the vendor, in his absence, although done without corruption, or by
some person whom he requested to do
it. It would subvert the whole policy
of the law, which forbids titles from
passing by parol, and requires the more
permanent evidence of writing and
sealing."
" A transfer to a person not named,"
said DENiO, J.,in Chazinty v. Arnold
(1862), 24 N. Y. 330, "or in any way
described, or designated, is * * a mere
nullity. To hold otherwise would let
in the mischief intended to be guarded
against in requiring a writing under seal
to work a disposition of property. But
although there is some diversity in the
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cases, I am of opinion that none of
modem date countenance the method
of creating a title to, or a lien upon
land," by the insertion of the name of
the mortgagee after delivery. "Cases
arising upon bills and notes are plainly
distinguishable :" these and bonds for
money, official bonds, and stock certificates if issued in blank, may be filled
up. "But no one," he adds, "would
be bold enough to contend that a paper,
intended to operate as a mortgage, could
be put in circulation in such a shape,
and by filling up, could be made obligatory on any one. This doctrine is
limited strictly to commercial paper, and
is based solely on its negotiable quality." To same effect is Ingram v. Litte (1853), 14 Ga. 173; and 2 ,Vashb.
R. P. 554.
Upon these principles and this reasoning announced, all the decisions can
be harmonized. In New York, the
case of Woolley v. Constant (i8o9), 4
Johns. 54, seems to be against this position, but in Bodine v. Killeen (1873),
53 N. Y. 93, it is supported. In the
language of the Court, "the law will
not permit one legally incapacitated to
do that indirectly which she cannot do
directly. This is especially the case
with infants and married women * * *;
the law imposing the disqualification
from motives of public policy, and for
the safety of those regarded as weak
and needing protection :" citing and
approving Aeen v. Coleman (1861), 39
Pa. 299; Lowell v. Daniels (1854), 2
Gray (Mass.) 16t; and Goulding v.
Davidson (1863), 26 N. Y. 604. In
Massachusetts, besides the leading case
of Burns v. Lynde (1863), 6 Allen 305;
Plummer v. Lord (I862), 5 ld. 460,
and Lowoellv. Daniels (1854), 2 Gray

161, support the doctrine, and in the
latter case, the separate deed of the
wife was declared invalid, because the
statute required a joint deed. It is
there stated that af me covert cannot

do by estoppel, what she cannot do by
deed, and that she is incapable of making a conveyance by estoppel in tair,
and that no case can be found where a
party was barred by estoppel in pais,
who was incapable of conveying by
deed.
The doctrine is followed in Pennsylvania: Glidden v. Strupler (1866), 52
Pa. 400; een v. Hartman and wife
(1865), 48 Id. 497; Keen v. Coleman (1861), 39 Id. 299. In this State
the doctrine that the wife has no capacity but that conferred by the law, is
The case which
strictly followed.
seems to differ, or contravene this principle: Wiley v. Aloor (1828), 17 S. &
R. 438, rests on the doctrine of estoppel, as applied to obligations disconnected with real estate, and where the
wife's capacity to enter into the contract
was not questioned.
In Glidden v. Strupler, supra, her
separate agreement to sell her land was
held void, although she had received
part of the purchase-money and the
purchaser made improvements thereon
with her knowledge and encouragement, because she had no capacity to
contract for the sale of her real estate
or to convey it, except by the precise
mode named in the statute, namely, by
joint deed, duly executed, and upon
privy examination; and hence, as she
did inot have capacity to make the agreement, she could not ratify or confirm it,
and therefore there could be no estoppel, even though she received the consideration, and improvements had been
erected by an innocent party. This
case reviews all the prior decisions.
Though these cases do not directly
assert the proposition that the deed of a
feme covert, executed with blanks in it,
is void, because she has no capacity to
execute such a deed; yet, they established the rule that she has no capacity
but that expressly given in the statute.
She was disabled at common law and.
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munder the equity doctrine, from executing such a deed, and the privy examination could only be had upon a completed deed. She retains this incapacity
unless the statute expressly removes it,
and provides in so many words that she
,can convey by such a deed; hence the
-rule that she has no capacity but that
-which the statute confers. If it does
not empower the execution of a deed in
blank, she cannot do it, because she
-could not do it at common law. The
same doctrine was held in Aeen v. Hartian (1865), 48 'a. 497, and Keen v.
Coleman (186i), 39 Id. 299, holding
that, as she had no capacity to execute
-the mortgage or bond, she was not
liable for the false representations of her
-capacity (thatshe was unmarried), which
induced third parties to contract with
-her,because the statute did not empower
her to make such a contract in such
-way.
The Alabama cases are governed by
-the same principle: .Afartin v. Martin
(853), 22 Ala.86; Jenkins v. A/cConico
{1855), 26 Id. 213.
In Alorrison v. Wilson (1859), 13
Cal. 498, the mortgage of the married
-woman's lands, executed by her trustee
holding the legal title, on the faith of
her representations that the trustee was
the sole owner, was declared invalid,
because she can convey her land, and
be divested of title, only according to
the forms prescribed in the statute, and
that estoppel in tais has no application
to the estates of a married woman.
This was followed in Maclayv. Love
(x864), 25 Cal. 374; Dentzel v. Waldie
(1866), 3 Id. 142; Bodley v.F erguson
(1866), 30 Id. 517.
[In Chase v. Palmer (1862), 29 II1.
said: "This deed is
3o6, BREESE, J.,
-wanting in one essential; namely, a
grantee, and is therefore void. It might
be very convenient, and probably productive of no injury to any interest of
society, that a party, wishing to sell 'a

tract of land, should be permitted to
execute and deliver the deed to an
agent, with a blank for the name of the
grantee, to be filled up when a purchaser should be found, but the law
does not permit it."
The Illinois cases were reviewed in
Oglesby Coal Co. v. Pasco (1875), 79
Ill. 17o, holding that the wife's verbal
agreement to release her interest in
realty, was not an estoppel, although
she received the consideration, because
her title could only be divested by deed
duly acknowledged, as provided by the
statute.
[Again, in Simms v. Iervey (1865),
19 Iowa 288, DILLON, J., said: "A deed
signed in blank is not, in the sense of
the law, executed. There must still be
under our statute, as at common law, a
grantor, a grantee, and a thing to be
granted, and these must be described in
the writing." But, in Devin v. Iimer
(1870), 29 Iowa 299, "the plaintiff and
his wife executed the deed for the defendant, and only left the name blank
because they did not know it in ful!;
he was the specific grantee intended;
he had express and full authority to
insert his owu name, and it was the intention he should do so, and it was
delivered for that object and purpose;
his-name was inserted pursuant to that
intention; the grantors ratified the same
and claim the benefit of the delivery
and of the perfected deed. * * * * *
We have no hesitation in holding the
deed valid and complete, nor would we
if the plaintiff were seeking to avoid
it :" COLE, C. J.
[In Quinn v. Brown (1887), 71 Iowa
376, the wife joined her husband in executing and acknowledging a deed with
the consideration and name of the
grantee blank, and left such deed with
her husband, who sold the land to an
innocent purchaser for value, inserting
the name and the consideration, and
delivering the deed to him: she was
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not permitted to assail the title, SEEvERS, J., saying-" The pivotal question
is, did she execute the deed in blank,
and leave it with her husband? * * *
She may not possibly have known the
character of the instrument, * ** and
as Brown had no knowledge that it had
been fraudulently procured, and as we
find he is a purchaser for value, he
should be protected."
The doctrine in Louisiana is the same
as in California: Bistand v. Provost
(1859), 14 La. An. 169.
In Lathrop6 v. Foster (1863), 51 Me.
367, a married woman was not estopped
by her deed, intended as a release of
dower, because it contained no words
of release, as the statute prescribed; and
see Rangey v. Spring (1842), 21 Me.
130, where it was held that a married
woman cannot be bound by her verbal
assent or actual knowledge of a cohveyance of her lands by her husband; and
that her knowledge of, or assent to, such
conveyance, is not necessary in order to
render the deed operative against the
husband.
The Maine Court recognized the
distinction between parol authority to
fill a bond, and a deed: Inhabitantsof
South Berwick v. Huntress (1865), 53
Me. 89. The case of Van Etla v.
Evemon (1871), 28 Wis. 33, does not
impinge upon this doctrine, because that
was a mortgage by a person suijuris,
and it was held good, on the ground
that the paper should have the effect
that the parties, at the time of its execution, intended it should have.
[Cooperv. Page(1872), 62 Me. 192;

here was no authority and no ratification of the act done, and the Court distinguished South Berwoick v. Huntress
on this ground.
The Mississippi Court announced the
same doctrine in Palmerv. Cross(1843),
x Sm. & M. 48 (Miss.), holding that the
statute provided the only mode by which
a married woman could be divested of'
her title; namely, by deed duly acknowledged.
The principle contended for was applied in Ohio ( Todd v. R.R. (x869), 19.
Ohio St. 514), holding that a married
woman's writing, intended as a dedication, duly executed, acknowledged, and
recorded, did not estop her from claiming the land, although the defendants
acquired valuable rights under the belief that the dedication was valid; on
the ground that she could only dispose
of, or encumber land, in the manner
specifically prescribed by the statute,
and what she could not deprive herself
of by direct and express contract, she
could not loose by way of estoppel;
citing OfIiller v. ttine (1862), 13 Ohio.
St. 565; and Purcellv. Goshern(i848),
17 Id. 165.
[But in Galbrathv. Lunsord(x 888),
87 Tenn. 89; s.c. 28 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER 126, it was held that a married woman may, by acts in pair, done
without any intentional fraud, estop
herself to assert title to her realty
against persons misled to their prejudice
by such acts, and this notwithstanding
the statutory requirements.
JNo. F. KELY.
St. Paul, Minn.

